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Abstract. Privacy enhancing security protocols (PESPs) are a family of
protocols that allow secure exchange of sensitive user information. They
are important in preserving users privacy in today’s open environment.
Like other security systems, proof of the correctness of PESPs is nec-
essary before they can be deployed. However, the traditional provable
security approach, though well established for verifying cryptographic
primitives, is not applicable to PESPs. We apply the formal method of
Coloured Petri Nets (CPNs) to construct an executable specification of
a representative PESP, namely the Private Information Escrow Bound
to Multiple Conditions Protocol (PIEMCP). Formal semantics of the
CPN specification allows us to reason about various security properties
of PIEMCP using state space techniques. This investigation has also led
us to a number of approaches for modeling and verification of PESPs
in general, demonstrating the benefit of applying CPN-based formal ap-
proach to proving the correctness of security protocols.
1 Introduction
As a response to the increasing number of incidents compromising the privacy
of millions of users [1–5], there has been an increase in the research related to
privacy enhancing security protocol (PESP). A PESP is a generic term that
refers to protocols whose main purpose is to preserve users privacy in an on-line
environment; for example, emulating the off-line anonymity afforded by cash
transaction, a PESP ensures that when a user purchases some goods on-line, the
on-line seller (also known as a service provider (SP)) does not learn the identity
of the user. Normally, PESPs apply existing cryptographic primitives (such as
secret sharing and encryption techniques) to provide the privacy-enhancing fea-
tures. In recent times, the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) technology - which
provides secure hardware storage of cryptographic keys and an implementation
of common cryptographic primitives - has also been used in PESP [6].
In this paper, we are interested in the modeling and verification of cryptographic-
based PESPs. In the cryptography domain, the main approach used to verify a
cryptographic primitive security is usually based on the provable security ap-
proach [7]. Unfortunately, these techniques cannot simply be used to verify
security properties of PESPs. The main reasons are due to (1) simplified as-
sumptions employed in the provable security approach are not realistic in the
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PESP environment, and (2) the scalability problem when the variables to con-
sider in assessing the security of a system goes beyond the relatively well-defined
boundaries normally encountered in cryptography [8].
Figure 1 illustrates the layers of attacks and security properties involved in
delivering a secure PESPs (and other systems that apply cryptographic primi-
tives). We can see that the types of security properties that we are interested
differ between layers. For example, for a signature scheme, we are interested in
verifying if the signature scheme has achieved the unforgeability property.
At the application layer (in which PESP resides), we are interested in whether
the orchestration of the cryptographic primitives employed deliver some application-
specific properties. For example, in PESPs, we are interested in verifying if the
claimed privacy behaviours of the protocol, such as whether the protocol pro-
vides a the revokable-but-abuse-resistant anonymity property. At this layer, the
required security properties are application-specific, therefore, they vary greatly
from one application to another.
Security properties are realized in the context of a set of attack models.
As shown in Figure 1, as we move up the layers, the types of attacks that we
need to consider also change. The attack models for cryptographic primitives
are generally well-known with well-defined boundaries [8] (such as the random
oracle model [9]). Similarly, a network attack model is well-defined, such as the
Dolev-Yao model [10]. At the application layer, however, there is no ‘standard’
attack model that is valid across applications. For example, the attack models
used for electronic cash systems are different from those used for PESPs due to
the different entities, goals, and security technologies applied to them.
Finally, at the application layer, the complexity of the system has increased
significantly as we now need to consider substantially more variables in the secu-
rity assessment, such as the number of entities involved, the number and types
of cryptographic primitives used, the number of message exchanges between the
entities, the assumed infrastructure, and so on. Each of these factors could in-
troduce new security vulnerabilities and exhaustive enumeration of all possible
attacks is impossible [8].
Given the different security requirements and attack models between crypto-
graphic primitives and applied cryptographic systems, such as PESPs, it is not
difficult to see why the provable security approach is not suitable. The provable
security approach reduces the security of a cryptographic system to some difficult
hard (normally mathematical) problems within the context of some standard at-
tack model with well-defined boundaries. Some security properties are said to
have been achieved when it is shown that the properties depend on some hard
problems which are not solvable in a polynomial time. This is not a suitable
approach to PESPs because (1) the security properties involved in PESPs are
such that it is counter-intuitive, if not misleading and impossible, to reduce them
to some hard mathematical problems, and (2) while the provable security ap-
proach is well-established for verifying the security of cryptographic primitives,
it is unable to scale to support PESP’s large, and growing, number of attacks.
The introduction of a new attack requires all security properties to be manually
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re-verified. There is no known tool to automate the provable security verification
process. In summary,the provable security approach is necessary, but not suffi-
cient for the modeling and verification of PESPs due to the different security
dimensions of a system they are used.
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Fig. 1: Layers of threats and security properties for PESPs
Proposed Approach Given the reasoning just detailed, we require an approach
that can (1) model a PESP such that its behaviours, including the behaviours
of the cryptographic primitives used, can be captured, and (2) be easily con-
figurable to capture various types of attacks so that when new types of attacks
are discovered, we could easily extend the model with this new information and
automatically re-evaluate the protocol to verify if the security properties still
hold. Formal method approach not only supports these features but also pro-
vides many additional benefits - details followed.
In this paper we propose an approach to modeling and verification of one
PESPs - the Private Information Escrow Bound to Multiple Conditions (PIEMC)
protocol [11] - using the Coloured Petri Net (CPN) technique [12] with the help
of the CPN Tool [13].
We choose to use CPN Tool over other formal methods because (1) it provides
the ability to model and capture the behavioural properties of a system, espe-
cially the concurrent behaviours, (2) it provides graphical interface that allows
easy understanding of the protocol being modeled; consequently, it allows easy
protocol debugging and allows PESP experts (who may not necessarily be ex-
perts in CPN) to validate if the model is a faithful representation of the PESP,
(3) it has a wide-range of existing analysis techniques, including state-space
analysis and state-invariants, (4) it supports modular approach to specifying
complex PESP, (5) it supports flexible data type definition which is very useful
in representing cyrptographic data, (6) CPN Tool is integrated with Standard
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ML (SML) inscription language [14] which proves to be very useful in capturing
many cryptographic processing behaviours, and (7) it allows attack models to be
parameterized such that various attack behaviours can be added to the model
incrementally, and consequently, allows re-use of the already-built artifacts re-
quired for verifying the security properties of the protocol. In addition, because
CPN has also been commonly used to analyse a system’s performance, and be-
cause efficiency is a major concern in PESP due to the use of resource-intensive
cryptographic primitive, it is a logical step to model and verify PESP using CPN
which can be later extended for performance analysis as well.
Our approach to using CPN in the modeling and verification of PESP consists
of several dimensions. In terms of modeling, a separation of concerns is applied
between the message-flow of PESPs from the processing (including cryptographic
processing) of those messages: the graphical interface of CPN is useful for cap-
turing the PESPs message flow, especially the concurrent behaviours, while the
integrated CPN inscription language (the Standard ML) is very powerful in cap-
turing a wide variety of cryptographic primitives and their associated processing
behaviours. In addition, the integrated textual input-output operation supported
in SML proves to be very useful in the processing of PESPs session data.
When verifying the security properties of a PESP, we use two approaches: (1)
querying and analysing the stored session data at each of the entities involved in
the protocol (session-data analysis), and (2) translating a set of common PESP
security properties into a series of statements whose correctness can be verified
using standard state-space analysis.
We identify repeatable patterns in both the modeling and the verification
dimension of our approach. Based on these identified patterns, we propose a set
of guidelines, notably guidelines related to how we could capture the behaviour
of cryptographic primitives in CPN) that can be used to model and verify PESPs
and other applied cryptographic protocols.
Furthermore, the case-study protocol used in this paper also employs the
TPM technology, in particular, those features of TPM technologies that pre-
serve user’s privacy [15] and provide the provable execution property [16]. These
features of TPM are very useful in PESP due to their ability to massively im-
prove the efficiency of PESPs: it allows one to remove many of the inefficient
resource-intensive cryptographic operations commonly used in PESPs. There-
fore, we expect the modeling guidelines to capture those TPM behaviours that
we present in this paper to be applicable to a wide-range of PESPs as well as
other systems that rely on the privacy-preserving and provable execution features
of TPMs.
To summarize, there are two main contributions detailed in this paper: the
proposal of using CPN and CPN Tool for the purpose of modeling and verify-
ing security properties of PESPs using the PIEMC protocol as the case-study
protocol, and a proposal for a set of guidelines and techniques that one can use
to model and verify security properties of PESPs. Although we only use one
case-study protocol to show the application of CPN for the purpose of modeling
and verification of PESP, the application of CPN as detailed in this paper and
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the resulting guidelines are nevertheless the result of experimenting the use of
CPN with several other PESPs [17,18].
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 discusses related
work, section 3 provides some background information of CPN and the PIEMC
protocol being modeled and verified in this paper. Section 4 and 6 details the
modeling and verification approach for the case-study PIEMC protocol, and
Section 7 provides the conclusion and future work.
2 Related Work
The use of formal methods to evaluate security protocols is well documented.
In this work we propose the application of formal methods to the new area
of PESPs. Al-Azzoni et al [19] propose the use of CPN to model and verify
cryptographic protocols. The main differences between their work and the work
proposed in this paper are: (1) their work focuses on the cryptographic protocol
itself while our work focuses on protocols which apply cryptographic primitives
(including cryptographic protocols), and (2) in comparison to the cryptographic
protocol being studied by Al-Azzoni et al [19], our work aims at modeling and
verifying PESPs which are of a much larger scale involving significantly more
message exchanges, and more cryptographic operations. In addition, in this pa-
per, we propose guidelines for capturing cryptographic primitives, their related
operations, and set of other generalized techniques (details in Section 4 and 6)
that can be usefully applied to modeling and verifying generic PESPs and other
protocols that apply cryptographic primitives.
Other related work include the Automated Validation of Internet Security
Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) tool [20] and Scyther [21]. These tools
are specially built to model and verify security protocols. The main benefit of
these tools is that they support the capturing of encryption data, encryption
keys, and also include built-in threat models that allow automatic verification
of some standard security properties, such as message confidentiality, integrity,
and authenticity properties. The problem with these tools is that they work
on modeling and verifying network-level threats and security properties. Such
limitation is evident from the types of attack models supported and the security
properties that can be verified. Furthermore, it is not evident how complex
cryptographic primitives (such as group encryption) and their related behaviours
can be represented using these tools.
For example, Scyther has built-in threat model which is based on the Dolev
and Yao network intruder model [10]. This threat model does not take into ac-
count malicious insider attacks, nor application-specific attacks, such as, in the
case of the PIEMC protocols, various message or encryption message manipula-
tions that a malicious entity could launch (details in Section 4.2). Consequently,
this limits the range of security properties that can be verified to those few
standard security properties such as confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and
non-repudiation. As a result, it is difficult to verify application-specific proper-
ties; for example, in PESPs, the security properties of interest (as explained in
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Section 3) are behavioural by nature and application-specific (not portable across
different applications). It is therefore not conceivable how these properties could
be automatically verified using the mentioned tools. This limitation is evident
from the list of security protocols that have been modeled using AVISPA1 or
Scyther2 whereby the majority of them are authentication protocols. When pro-
tocols related to privacy (such as Geopriv [22]) are modeled, the privacy property
is normally reduced to confidentiality and authenticity properties. We argue that
this is a simplistic approach to verifying privacy properties and that privacy does
not simply equate to confidentiality and/or authenticity.
The main reason for the inadequacy of these tools can be attributed to the
fact that these tools attempt to, with good and legitimate reasons, abstract
as much as possible the security protocol modeling and verification process.
However, this abstraction comes at a cost of restrictions and inflexibility in the
range of their applications. To cope with PESPs whereby attacks and security
properties vary from one application to another, it is almost inevitable for us to
go down to a lower-level approach whereby fewer abstractions or automations are
available, but more flexibility and wider application range are afforded. Simple
Homomorphism Verification Tool (SHVT) [23] is an example of such a tool, which
is based on the model-checker approach. SHVT allows one to model a protocol,
formalize security goals and attack models, followed by verification of security
goals by specifying some transition patterns and checks if they are achievable
(see Du [24, Chapter 5 and 6] for applications of the SHVT). There are many
similarities between SHVT and the CPN approach this paper; however, we argue
that SHVT lacks the graphical interface support that CPN has which makes the
benefits associated with having a graphical interface as explained in Section 1.1)
unattainable. Besides, SHVT lacks the performance analysis support that CPN
has - which makes the use of a SHVT less desirable choice for the purpose of
PESPs.
Finally, another type of formal method approach known as process algebra
has also been proposed to model and verify security protocols [25, 26]. Readers
who are interested in the comparison between process algebra and petri nets
should consult the paper by Aalst [27]. In summary, each approach has its own
merits; nevertheless, in this paper, we choose the CPN approach because it is
relatively simple and easy to understand (as opposed to process algebra where
simple things could become very complicated [27]). We do not claim that CPN
is better, rather, we prefer to use the CPN approach over process algebra.
3 PIEMC Preliminary
In this section, we introduce a PESP: the Private Information Escrow Bound
to Multiple Conditions (PIEMC) protocol. The PIEMC protocol [11] is used
in a federated single-sign on (FSSO) environment whereby a user only has to
authenticate once to an identity provider (IdP) in order to access services from
1 http://avispa-project.org/library/index.html
2 http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/Software/spore/
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Fig. 3: Second variant of PIEMC protocol -
without trusted ARM
multiple service provider (SP)s. There are 5 main entities involved in the PIEMC
protocol: user, IdP, SP, anonymity revocation manager (ARM), and referees. An
IdP vouches to the SPs that although the user is anonymous, when certain con-
ditions are fulfilled, the user’s identity can be revealed. Obviously, the nature of
the services that SPs provide is such that although a user’s identity information
is not required in service delivery, it may be conditionally revealed in the future.
An ARM or a group of referees is responsible for revoking the user’s anonymity
when conditions are satisfied.
There are two variants of the PIEMC protocol: the first variant (denoted
as PIEMC-T) uses a trusted ARM for anonymity revocation (Figure 2). The
second variant (denoted as PIEMC-NT) does not use an ARM, instead, a group
of referees is used for revoking users anonymity (Figure 3). In this paper, we
focus on the the second variant of the protocol. To aid an understanding of the
PIMEC-NT model detailed in Section 4, we provide the details of PIEMC-NT
in Section 3.1. As PIEMC-T is not the focus of this paper, we only summarize
its operation in Section 3.1.
For PIEMC security properties verification purpose detailed in Section 6, a
summary of the relevant key security properties is provided in Section 3.3.
3.1 PIEMC-NT
In this section, we describe PIEMC-NT. It consists of four stages: the personally
identifiable information (PII) escrow (PE) stage, key escrow (KE) stage, multiple
conditions (MC) stage, and the Revocation stage.
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PE stage The first stage is the PII escrow stage which is started when a user
needs to access some services from a SP - say SP1. Upon receiving the service
request from the user, the user and SP1 agree on a set of conditions under which
the user’s PII can be revealed - we denote such conditions as Cond1. Next, the
PII escrow stage starts:
1. NT-PE-1: SP1 sends a request to the IdP for the user’s PII to be escrowed.3
Included in this request are the agreed conditions Cond1 between the user
and SP1 under which the user’s PII can be disclosed.
2. NT-PE-2: The user encrypts his/her PII using a Verifiable Encryption (VE)
scheme under a freshly generated key pair. The user sends to the IdP the
ciphertext (which should contain the PII) and the public key used to produce
the ciphertext. At this stage, the user keeps the corresponding private key
(that is needed to recover the PII from the ciphertext) undisclosed.
3. NT-PE-3: From the given encryption and other data, the user and IdP engage
in a cryptographic ‘proof-of-knowledge’ protocol (PK). This PK is used to
prove to the IdP that the encryption that the user gives correctly encrypts
the user’s PII without letting the IdP learn the value of the PII itself. We
denote such an operation a PK-VE operation. The output of a PK-VE is either
the acceptance or rejection from the IdP regarding the correctness of the
given VE ciphertext.
Note that the proposed modeling and verification approach only model crypto-
graphic primitives behaviours necessary for the PIEMC protocol - we are not
interested in the security of the cryptographic primitives themselves.
KE stage Assuming that the PK-VE is successful, the PIEMC protocol continues
to the KE stage:
– NT-KE-1: the IdP and the user engage in a type of cryptographic PK protocol,
called the Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) which is used to testify
that the user is using a valid TPM device without learning the identity of
the TPM device - thus privacy-preserving.
– NT-KE-2: the user’s TPM generates a universal custodian-hiding verifiable
group encryption (UCHVE) of the VE private key (generated from the pre-
vious PE stage) under Cond1 and the corresponding TPM proof. For n
referees, such a UCHVE produces n ciphertext pieces to be given to n refer-
ees. Out of these n referees, t referees are the designated referees and n − t
are the non-designated referees. Only designated referees can decrypt the
ciphertext pieces. At least k (k ≤ t) decrypted ciphertext pieces are required
in order to recover the VE private key. k is known as the threshold value.
These n ciphertext pieces are sent to the IdP.
– NT-KE-3: The IdP verifies the proof, and if correct, prepares a response to
SP2, which include the VE of PII (from the PE stage) and the UCHVE of
the VE private key.
3 An escrow process normally involves encrypting some sensitive information that only
a trusted party can decrypt
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SP1 now has the ciphertext of the PII (from the PE stage) and the ciphertext of
the corresponding private key (from the KE stage). This allows SP1 to recover
the user’s PII when Cond1 is fulfilled with the help of a set of referees (see the
Revocation stage in Section 3.1) - SP1 cannot decrypt these ciphertexts at this
point.
MC stage Next, the protocol assumes that the user goes to another SP2, who,
similar to SP1, needs the IdP to escrow the user’s PII such that the user’s PII
can be revealed when some agreed conditions Cond2 (Cond1 6= Cond2). This
triggers the start of the MC stage:
– NT-MC-1: SP2 requests the IdP to escrow K PRIV VE
– NT-MC-2: the IdP requests the user’s TPM to produce a new UCHVE cipher-
text of the VE private key, this time under Cond2, and the corresponding
TPM proof.
– NT-MC-3: The user replies with the requested encryption and proof to the
IdP.
– NT-MC-4: The IdP verifies the proof, and if correct, prepares a response to
SP2, which include VE of PII (from the PE stage) and the UCHVE of the
VE private key (this time encrypted under Cond2).
SP2 now has the ciphertext of the PII (from the PE stage) and the ciphertext of
the corresponding private key (from the KE stage). This allows SP2 to recover
the user’s PII when Cond1 is fulfilled with the help of a set of referees (see the
Revocation stage in Section 3.1). SP2 cannot decrypt these ciphertexts at this
point.
In the same session, the user can go to another service provider, say SP3.
In this case, due to the single sign-on property, only the MC stage that has to
be executed (the PE and KE stage do not have to be executed again). Since an
additional MC stage does not reveal any additional capabilities or properties of
the PIEMC protocol, the modeling of additional MC stage operation with SP3
is unnecessary.
We define a session as the execution of the PE, KE, and one or more MC
stages. A user can execute multiple sessions, that is, those three stages are re-
peatable as necessary. The number of sessions to be executed by the model is
parameterized by the session parameter (see Table 2 - last line).
Revocation stage A distinct stage in the PIEMC protocol is the revocation
stage. This stage is executed as needed, however, at a minimum, we require that
the user has at least completed one session. The revocation stage is triggered
only when some conditions, say Cond1, are fulfilled.
– NT-REV-1: SP1 sends n ciphertext pieces to n referees with Cond1
– NT-REV-2: Each referee verifies if Cond1 is fulfilled. If so, try to decrypt the
given ciphertext piece. Only designated referees can decrypt the ciphertext
piece. If decryption is successful, eacn designated referee sends the decrypted
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ciphertext piece to SP1. When SP1 receives k or more decrypted pieces, it
can recover the VE private key, and subsequently decrypt the VE ciphertext
to recover the user’s PII.
3.2 PIEMC with trusted ARM
In this section, we summarize the first variant of the PIEMC-T protocol. The
main difference between this variant with the one described in Section 3.2 is
that in PIEMC-NT without trusted ARM, we (1) replace the referees with a
trusted ARM, and (2) we use the identity-based re-encryption scheme instead of
the group encryption scheme (denoted as CIPHER UCHVE KVE) to encrypt
K PRIV VE during the KE stage.
PE stage
– T-PE-1: similar to NT-PE-1 except that in addition to Cond1, SP1 needs to
provide some UCHVE encryption parametert to the IdP which the user and
SP1 have agreed beforehand. These parameters include three variables: n, t,
and k (explained in detail in the next section).
– T-PE-2: same as NT-PE-2
– T-PE-3: same as NT-PE-3
KE stage
– T-KE-1: the IdP requests the trusted ARM to escrow the VE private key
(generated from the PE stage previously).
– T-KE-2: similar to NT-KE-1 except that this time the DAA is executed be-
tween the user and the ARM.
– T-KE-3: the TPM device generates the encryption of the VE private key
(generated from the PE stage) using an identity-based proxy-reencryption
scheme (IBEPRE) and a proof that act as an evidence that the IBEPRE ci-
phertext correctly encrypts VE private key under the conditions Cond1 (this
refers to the provable execution feature of TPM). This IBEPRE ciphertext
cryptographically binds the encryption of the VE private key with Cond1.
These data are sent to the ARM.
– T-KE-4: the ARM verifies the proof and if the proof is correct, sends the
IBEPRE ciphertext of the VE private key to the IdP.
– T-KE-5: the IdP prepares a response to SP1. Included in the response mes-
sage are VE ciphertext of the PII (from the PE stage) and the ciphertext of
the corresponding private key.
SP1 now has the ciphertext of the PII (from the PE stage) and the ciphertext of
the corresponding private key (from the KE stage). This allows SP1 to recover
the user’s PII when Cond1 is fulfilled with the help of the trusted ARM (see the
Revocation stage in Section 3.2) - SP1 cannot decrypt these ciphertexts at this
point.
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MC stage
– T-MC-1: SP2 requests the IdP to escrow K PRIV VE
– T-MC-2: The IdP contacts the ARM to produce a re-encryption of CIPHER IBEPRE KVE
which was originally bound to Cond1 such that the new ciphertext is crypto-
graphically bound to Cond2. Note that during a re-encryption process, the
ARM does not learn the value of K PRIV VE.
– T-MC-3: The ARM verifies if such a re-encryption request is valid
– T-MC-4: The user replies with the validity of such a re-encryption request (a
’yes’ or ’no’ answer)
– T-MC-5: The ARM produces the re-encryption of CIPHER IBEPRE KVE,
this time cryptographically bound to Cond2
– T-MC-6: The IdP the IdP prepares a response to SP2. Included in the re-
sponse message are CIPHER IBEPRE KVE (cryptographically bound to
Cond2 and CIPHER VE PII.
SP2 now has the ciphertext of the PII (from the PE stage) and the ciphertext of
the corresponding private key (from the KE stage). This allows SP2 to recover
the user’s PII when Cond1 is fulfilled with the help of the trusted ARM (see the
Revocation stage in Section 3.2) - SP2 cannot decrypt these ciphertexts at this
point.
In the same session, the user can go to another service provider, say SP3.
In this case, due to the single sign-on property, only the MC stage that has to
be executed (the PE and KE stage do not have to be executed again). Since
additional MC stage does not reveal any additional capabilities or properties of
a PIEMC protocol, the modeling of additional MC stage operation with SP3 is
unnecessary.
Revocation
– T-REV-1: SP1 sends CIPHER IBEPRE KVE and Cond1 to the ARM.
– T-REV-2: The ARM verifies if Cond1 is fulfilled, and if so, decrypt CI-
PHER IBEPRE KVE to recover K PRIV VE, and send it to SP1 who can
then use it to decrypt CIPHER VE PII to recover the user’s PII.
3.3 Main PIEMC Properties
There are several security properties that we need to verify. These security prop-
erties are the same for both variants of the PIEMC protocol. These security
properties are:
Multiple Conditions : at the end of every session, a user’s escrowed PII must
be bound to multiple sets of alternative conditions (each to be used with
different SPs).
Zero-knowledge property : this property has two dimensions: (1) prior to
conditions fulfillment, IdP, SP, and referees must not learn the value of the
user’s PII but at the same time can be convinced that its encryption is
correct; (2) when conditions are fulfilled, the revealed PII must be the same
as the one certified in the user certificate.
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Enforceable Conditions : a user’s PII should never be revealed before all
designated referees (the UCHVE threshold value) agree that some conditions
which are cryptographically bounded to the PII are satisfied.
Conditions Abused Resistant : an SP, IdP, or user should not be able to
trick the user or ARM to encrypt the user PII, or the VE private key, under
a set of conditions different from those agreed between a user and an SP.
Similarly, an SP or IdP must not be able to successfully revoke the user’s
PII using a set of conditions other than those originally agreed.
Session Unlinkability : SPs and IdP must not be able to link, from the avail-
able session artifacts, a user from one session to another.
4 Modeling the PIEMC Protocol
A background of CPN is provided before the model is described in details.
4.1 CPN Preliminary
A CPN consists of two types of nodes, places (drawn as ellipses) and transitions
(rectangles), and directed edges known as arcs. A place is typed by a color set
and contains collections (multi-sets) of data items called tokens of the same type
as the place. A transition represents an event and may have a guard associated
with it. The guard is a boolean expression enclosed in square brackets. Arcs
connect places to transitions and transitions to places, and are inscribed by
expressions comprising variables, constants and functions. Variables are typed
and can be assigned values known as binding.
A transition’s input places have arcs going to the transition, while its out-
put places have arcs coming from the transition. A transition is enabled if: 1)
sufficient tokens exist in each input place to match each respective input arc
inscription when evaluated for a particular binding of its variables, and 2) the
transition guard evaluates to true for the same binding. If a transition is enabled,
it can occur (or be fired). The occurrence of a transition removes tokens spec-
ified by the respective arc inscriptions from input places, and deposits tokens
specified by inscriptions on the output arcs into output places. The state of a
CPN is called a marking. It consists of tokens distributed on each place of the
CPN. Occurrence of transitions represent stage changes.
The hierarchical features of CPNs facilitate the constructions of large models
by using a number of CPN modules called pages. Each page is linked to a substi-
tution transition (sub-transition) at a higher level of the model. By means of the
hierarchical structuring mechanism it is possible to capture different abstraction
levels of the modeled system in the same CPN model.
4.2 Model Description
We have modeled both variants of the PIEMC protocol (see Section 3.2 and 3.1).
For each variant, there is one main protocol page, with 4-subpages, each repre-
senting the four main stages of the protocol: the PE, KE, MC, and revocation
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stage. Each PE page in both variants has one helper sub-page. For each model,
we parameterize the number of repeatable session (including the PE,KE, and
MC stage) to be executed. Similarly, the attack model for each variant of the
protocol is also parameterized.
Cryptographic Data CPN Colour
VE ciphertext of PII CIPHER VE PII
VE Public / Private key K PUB VE/K PRIV VE
UCHVE cihpertext of K PRIV VE (representing all the CIPHER UCHVE KVE
n ciphertext pieces as a whole)
UCHVE ciphertext of K PRIV VE (representing an individual CIPHER UCHVE KVE PIECE
K PRIV VE ciphertext piece).
IBEPRE of K PRIV VE CIPHER IBEPRE KVE
Table 1: Mapping between cryptographic data to CPN colours
Due to space limitation, an exhaustive description of both models is not pos-
sible; instead, selective CPN pages which capture our key modeling approach
to PESPs is described. The main page and the PE page for both variants are
similar, therefore, we will only describe them once. The KE, MC, and the re-
vocation pages are different between both variants. We choose to describe the
KE page and the revocation page for the second variant (without trusted ARM)
because they capture the TPM-related operations (the KE page) and because it
enables use to show the richer revocation stage operation involving concurrent
operations and complex attack scenarios. While we have modeled the rest of the
pages (the KE and revocation page for the first protocol variant and the MC
pages for both variants) for the purpose of security properties verification, they
do not show any additional modeling approach that has not already been cap-
tured by the other pages described. Several main CPN colour definitions have
been provided in Table 2.
Main page Figure 4 shows the main page for both variants of the PIEMC
protocol. As described earlier, the protocol starts with a user and a service
provider SP1 agreeing on a set of conditions (represented by the transition U
SP1 GENERATE CONDITIONS) then proceed to execute the PE stage (captured
in the subtransition PII Escrow), followed by the KE stage (represented by
another subtransition Key Escrow). Upon completion of the KE stage, the user
goes to another service provider SP2 and they both then agree on another set of
conditions (represented by the transition U SP2 GENERATE CONDITIONS) before
starting the MC stage (represented by a subtransition Multiple Conditions).
The completion of the MC stage marks the completion of one session. At the
end of a session, we store the session data accumulated by all entities. How many
session that the user executes is parameterized by the value of session. As long
as the value of the variable counter is less than or equal to session (note the
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1 colset SP_REQ = record genCond:STRING * conditions1:STRING *
2 <other fields omitted for simplicity>
3 colset SP_REQ_SIG = record message:SP_REQ * key:K_SIGN_GEN;
4 colset SIGNED_SP_REQ = record message:SP_REQ * signat:SP_REQ_SIG;
5 colset K_PUB_VE = INT;
6 colset K_PRIV_VE = INT;
7 colset K_SIGN_GEN = INT;
8 colset PII = STRING;
9 colset LABEL = STRING;
10 colset PROVABILITY = BOOL;
11 colset COMMITMENT_PII = record message:PII * random:RANDOM;
12 colset SIGNATURE_GEN = record message:MSG * key:K_SIGN_GEN *
13 provable: PROVABILITY;
14 colset SIGNED_MSG = record message:MSG * signat:SIGNATURE_GEN;
15 colset CIPHER_VE_PII = record message:PII * key:K_PUB_VE * label:LABEL *
16 provable:PROVABILITY;
17 colset CIPHER_UCHVE_KVE = record message:K_PRIV_VE*
18 groupKeys:K_PUB_UCHVE_LIST* desigMembers:DESIG_MEMBERS_LIST *
19 k:THRESHOLD *n:INT * t:INT * label:LABEL * provable:BOOL;
20 colset CIPHER_UCHVE_KVE_PIECE = record message:K_PRIV_VE *
21 key:K_PUB_UCHVE * label:LABEL * isDesignated:BOOL;
22 colset SP_RESPONSE = record pseudo:STRING * cipherVE:CIPHER_VE_PII *
23 cipherUCHVE:CIPHER_UCHVE_KVE;
24 colset SP_RESPONSE_SIG = record message:SP_RESPONSE * key:K_SIGN_GEN *
25 provable:BOOL;
26 colset SIGNED_SP_RESPONSE= record message:SP_RESPONSE *
27 signat:SP_RESPONSE_SIG;
28 colset DEC_REQ = record conditions:LABEL *
29 uchvePiece:CIPHER_UCHVE_KVE_PIECE;
30 colset DEC_REQ_SIGNATURE = record message:DEC_REQ *
31 key:K_SIGN_GEN * provable:BOOL;
32 colset SIGNED_DEC_REQ = record message:DEC_REQ * signat:DEC_REQ_SIGNATURE;
33
34 Parameters:
35 val USER_ATTACK1 = false;
36 val USER_ATTACK2 = false;
37 val USER_ATTACK3 = false;
38 val USER_ATTACK4 = false;
39 val SP_ATTACK1 = false;
40 val SP_ATTACK11 = false;
41 val SP_ATTACK12 = false;
42 val SP_ATTACK2 = false;
43 val SP_ATTACK22 = false;
44 val SP_ATTACK3 = false;
45 val SP_ATTACK4 = false;
46 val SP_ATTACK5 = false;
47 val SP_ATTACK6 = false;
48 val IDP_ATTACK4 = false;
49 val REF_ATTACK1 = false;
50 val REF_ATTACK2 = false;
51 val condActually = true;
52 val fulfilled =
53 if REF_ATTACK1 then true else
54 if SP_ATTACK4 then false else
55 condActually;
56 val session=2;
Table 2: Colour Definition for PIEMC
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true
true
counter
true
true
true
true true
result
result
[counter<=session]
[result]
BOOL
1
INT
true
BOOL
BOOL
START PII
ESCROW
BOOL
PII
BOOL
BOOL
BOOL
BOOL
BOOL
PE
COMPLETED
CONTINUE
KEY ESCROW
START
KEY ESCROW
KEY 
ESCROW
KE
KE
COMPLETED
CONTINUE TO
MULTIPLE
CONDITIONS
USER GOES
TO SP2
U SP2 GENERATE
CONDITIONS
START
MULTIPLE
CONDITIONS
MULTIPLE
CONDITIONS
STAGE
MC
MULTIPLE BINDING
COMPLETED
STORE SESSION 
DATA
COUNTER
U SP1 GENERATE
CONDITIONS
START
SETUP
true
counter+1
counter
REVOCATION
STAGE
REVOCATION
RECOVERED
USER PII
if counter>session then 1`true else empty
SP1 REVOCATION CONDITIONS
FULFILLED
input();
output ();
action
let
val condRandom = getRandom()
val userRec = readUserRecord("user.txt")
val condSP2 = "Conditions SP2"^condRandom
val conditions = #conditions(userRec)
 val conditions = USER_CONDITIONS.set_conditions2 conditions condSP2
 val userRec = USER_RECORD.set_conditions userRec conditions
 val userRec = updateUserRecord("user.txt", userRec)
 val spRec = readSPRecord("sp2.txt")
 val spRec = SP_RECORD.set_conditions spRec condSP2
in
 updateSPRecord("sp2.txt", spRec)
end;
input ();
output ();
action
let
val _ = resetARMRecord("arm.txt")
val _ = resetUserRecord("user.txt")
val _ = resetSP1Record("sp1.txt")
val _ = resetSP2Record("sp2.txt")
val _ = resetIDPRecord("idp.txt")
 val condRandom = getRandom()
val userRec = readUserRecord("user.txt")
val condSP1 = "Conditions SP1"^condRandom
val genCond = "GenCond"^getRandom()
val conditions = #conditions(userRec)
 val conditions = USER_CONDITIONS.set_conditions1 conditions condSP1
 val conditions = USER_CONDITIONS.set_genCond conditions genCond
 val userRec = USER_RECORD.set_conditions userRec conditions
 val userRec = updateUserRecord("user.txt", userRec)
 val spRec = readSPRecord("sp1.txt")
 val spRec = SP_RECORD.set_genCond spRec genCond
 val spRec = SP_RECORD.set_conditions spRec condSP1
in
 updateSPRecord("sp1.txt", spRec)
end;
input (counter);
output ();
action
let 
val userRec = readUserRecord("user.txt")
 val idpRec = readIDPRecord("idp.tx ")
 val armRec = readARMRecord("arm.txt")
 val sp1Rec = readSPRecord("sp1.txt")
 val sp2Rec = readSPRecord("sp2.txt")
 val _ = updateUserRecord("user_sess"^Int.toString(counter-1)^".txt", userRec)
 val _ = updateIDPRecord("idp_sess"^Int.toString(counter-1)^".txt", idpRec)
 val _ = updateArmRecord("arm_sess"^Int.toString(counter-1)^".txt", armRec)
 val _ = updateSPRecord("sp1_sess"^Int.toString(counter-1 ^".txt", sp1Rec)
in
 updateSPRecord("sp2_sess"^Int.toString(counter-1)^".txt", sp2Rec)
end;
PII
ESCROW
PE
true
1 1`1
1
1`true
Fig. 4: Main PIEMC page for both variants
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guard function of the transition U SP1 GENERATE CONDITIONS), the model will
execute another session. Otherwise, the guard function will disable the transi-
tion, instead, a token will be placed at the place SP1 REVOCATION CONDITIONS
FULFILLED (note the arc inscription from the transition STORE SESSION DATA
to the mentioned place) which triggers the start of a revocation stage. The end
result of the revocation stage is the success or failure of the revelation of the
user’s PII as represented by the existence (or non-existence) token in the place
RECOVERED USER PII.
true
true
true
true
signedPseudosignedPseudo
result
commitment
userVeCipher
userVeKey
cert
commitment
commitment
userVeCipher
userVeKey
escrowReqSig
escrowReqSig
escrowReqSig
sp1Req
[result]
GENERATE
ONE TIME
DATA
GENERATE ONE TIME DATA
IDP VERIFIES SP1 REQ
AND STARTS PII ESCROW
BOOL
BOOL
BOOL
SIGNED_MSG
BOOL
(#cert(readUserRecord(
"user.txt")))
CERTIFICATE
COMMITMENT_PII
CIPHER_VE_PII
K_PUB_VE
BOOL
PII VE 
CIPHER
CIPHER_VE_PII
ONE TIME
VE KEYS
K_VE
PII
COMMIT
COMMITMENT_PII
SPI1 ESCROW
REQ RECEIVED
SIGNED_SP_REQ
SP_REQ
START PII
ESCROWIn
SP1 PREPARES
PII ESCROW 
REQUEST
SP1 PII
ESCROW REQ
SP1 SIGNS
PII REQ
SP1 SENDS
ESCROW REQ
IDP RECV
GENERAL CONDITIONS
SIGNED_SP_REQ
(#genCond(
(#message(
escrowReqSig))))
idpGenCond
LABEL
IDP RECV
PII VE CIPHER
userVeCipher
IDP RECV
ONE TIME VE PUB KEY
idpVeKey
idpVeCipher
IDP RECV
PII COMMIT
idpCommitment
USER
CERTIFICATE
START
USER
SESSION
PE
COMPLETEOut
PSEUDONYM
RECEIVED
SP1 PII REQ 
SIGNATURE
CAN SEND
PII ESCROW DATA
U STORES
PSEUDONYM
PI PII VE
CIPHER RESULT
IDP GENERATES 
STORES
PSEUDONYM AND
SEND TO USER
input (escrowReqSig);
output ();
action
let
 val genCond = #genCond(#message(escrowReqSig))
 val conditions1 = #conditions1(#message(escrowReqSig))
 val idpRec = readIDPRecord("idp.txt")
 val idpCons = #idpConditions(idpRec)
 val idpCons = IDP_CONDITIONS.set_genCond idpCons genCond
 val idpCons = IDP_CONDITIONS.set_conditions1 idpCons conditions1
 val idpRec = IDP_RECORD.set_idpConditions idpRec idpCons
 val uchveCipher = #cipherUCHVE1(idpRec)
 val groupKeys = #uchvePubKeys(#message(escrowReqSig))
 val uchveCipher = CIPHER_UCHVE_KVE.set_groupKeys uchveCipher groupKeys
 val k = #k(#message(escrowReqSig))
 val t = #t(#message(escrowReqSig))
 val n = #n(#message(escrowReqSig))
 val uchveCipher = CIPHER_UCHVE_KVE.set_k uchveCipher k
 val uchveCipher = CIPHER_UCHVE_KVE.set_t uchveCipher t
 val uchveCipher = CIPHER_UCHVE_KVE.set_n uchveCipher n
 val idpRec = IDP_RECORD.set_cipherUCHVE1 idpRec uchveCipher
in
 updateIDPRecord("idp.txt", idpRec)
end;
input (escrowReqSig);
output ();
action
let 
val spRec = readSPRecord("sp1.txt")
 
in 
updateSPRecord("sp1.txt", spRec)
end;
input ();
output (signedPseudo);
action
let
 val idpRec = readIDPRecor ("idp.txt")
 val pseudo = "pseudo"^getRandom();
 val idpRec = IDP_RECORD.set_pseudo idpRec pseudo
 
val signKey = #signKey(idpRec)
 val pseudoSig  if not IDP_ATTACK4 the  sign(pseudo, signKey) else sign(pseudo, 999)
 val signedPs udo = {message=pseudo, 
signat=pseudoSig}
 
val idpRec = updateIDPR cord("idp.txt", idpRec)
in
 signedPseudo
end;
if not SP_ATTACK5 then 1`{message=sp1Req, 
signat={message=sp1Req,
key=(#signKey(readSPRecord("sp1.txt"))),
provable=false}} else
1`{message=sp1Req, 
signat={message=sp1Req,
key=999, provable=false}}
input (signedPseudo);
output ();
action
let
 val userRec = readUserRecord("user.txt")
 val pseudo = #message(signedPseudo)
 val userRec = USER_RECORD.set_pseudo userRec pseudo
in
 updateUserRecord("user.txt", userRec)
end;
input (idpGenCond, idpVeCipher, idpVeKey, userVeKey);
output ();
action
let 
val idpRec = readIDPRecord("idp.txt")
 val cons = #idpConditions(idpRec)
 val cons = IDP_CONDITIONS.set_genCond cons idpGenCond
 val idpRec = IDP_RECORD.set_idpConditions idpRec cons
 val idpRec = IDP_RECORD.set_vePubKey idpRec idpVeKey
 val idpRec = IDP_RECORD.set_cipherVE idpRec idpVeCipher
 val idpRec = updateIDPRecord("idp.txt", idpRec)
 val userRec = readUserRecord("user.txt")
 val userRec = USER_RECORD.set_veKeys userRec userVeKey
 val userRec = updateUserRecord("user.txt", userRec)
in 
idpRec
end;
[(#message(escrowReqSig)) = 
(#message(#signat(escrowReqSig)))
andalso
(#key(#signat(escrowReqSig))) = 
(#sp1VerifyKey(#verifyKeys(
 readIDPRecord("idp.txt"))))]
[verify(signedPseudo,
(#idpVerifyKey(
#verifyKeys(
readUserRecord("user.txt")))))]
if SP_ATTACK1 then 
{genCond="EasyGenCond", 
conditions1=(#conditions(readSPRecord("sp1.txt"))),
uchvePubKeys=(#groupKeys(#cipherUCHVE(readSPRecord("sp1.txt")))),
k=(#k(#cipherUCHVE(readSPRecord("sp1.txt")))),
t=(#t(#cipherUCHVE(readSPRecord("sp1.txt")))),
n=(#n(#cipherUCHVE(readSPRecord("sp1.txt"))))} else
if SP_ATTACK11 then
{genCond=(#genCond(readSPRecord("sp1.txt"))), 
conditions1="EasyToFulfillConditions",
uchvePubKeys=(#groupKeys(#cipherUCHVE(readSPRecord("sp1.txt")))),
k=(#k(#cipherUCHVE(readSPRecord("sp1.txt")))),
t=(#t(#cipherUCHVE(readSPRecord("sp1.txt")))),
n=(#n(#cipherUCHVE(readSPRecord("sp1.txt"))))} else
if SP_ATTACK12 then
{genCond=(#genCond(readSPRecord("sp1.txt"))), 
conditions1=(#conditions(readSPRecord("sp1.txt"))),
uchvePubKeys=[7,8,9],
k=1, t=1, n=3} else
{genCond=(#genCond(readSPRecord("sp1.txt"))), 
conditions1=(#conditions(readSPRecord("sp1.txt"))),
uchvePubKeys=(#groupKeys(#cipherUCHVE(readSPRecord("sp1.txt")))),
k=(#k(#cipherUCHVE(readSPRecord("sp1.txt")))),
t=(#t(#cipherUCHVE(readSPRecord("sp1.txt")))),
n=(#n(#cipherUCHVE(readSPRecord("sp1.txt"))))}
U SENDS PII
ESCROW DATA
IDP_U PK PII
VE CIPHER
if #provable(idpVeCipher) andalso
#provable(cert) andalso
#signKey(cert) = #certVerifyKey(
 #verifyKeys(readIDPRecord("idp.txt"))) andalso
#message(idpCommitment) = #pii(cert) andalso
#message(idpVeCipher) = #message(idpCommitment) andalso
#message(idpVeCipher) = #pii(cert) andalso
idpVeKey = #key(idpVeCipher) andalso
idpGenCond = #label(idpVeCipher) then 1`true
else 1`false
if not USER_ATTACK2 then 
#pub(userVeKey) else
0
SERVICE PROVIDER 1- SP1 IDENTITY PROVIDER - IDP USER
1
1`{pii="m_a",signKey=501,provable=
true}
Fig. 5: PE page for both variants of PIEMC
PE page This p ge represents the PE stage f r both variants of the PIEMC pro-
tocol (see Figure 4.2). The message T-PE-1 is re resented by the place SP1 PII
REQ SIGNATURE, which is of type SIGN D SP REQ. From Table 2, this message
re resents a cry to rap ically igned message by SP1 and the main content of
the message is the conditions Co un er which the user’s PII can be revealed.
There are other values included in this m ssage, however, they are omitted for
sim licity.
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COMMITMENT_PII
K_VE
CIPHER_VE_PII
START
USER
SESSION
In
BOOL
BOOL
BOOL
genKey(Option.valOf(
Int.fromString(getRandom())))
userVeKey
true
true
true
true
U GENERATES
ONE TIME DATA
ONE TIME
VE KEYS
Out
START
ENCRYPT
PII
commit(#pii(readUserRecord("user.txt")))
PII
COMMIT
Out
PII VE 
CIPHER
Out
if not USER_ATTACK1 then veEnc(
#pii(readUserRecord("user.txt")),
#pub(userVeKey),
#genCond(#conditions(
readUserRecord("user.txt")))) else
veEnc(
"bogusPII",
#pub(userVeKey),
"arbitraryCond")CAN SEND
PII ESCROW DATA
Out
U GENERATES
PII CIPHER
Fig. 6: Cryptographic One-time Data Generation
Next, the signed message is sent to the IdP who first verify the signature valid.
If it is valid, the user sends the T-PE-2 message (represented by the transition
U SENDS PII ESCROW DATA. There are three data being sent in this message:
the commitment (a type of cryptographic data) of the user PII (represented by
the place IDP RECV PII COMMIT), the user-generated one-time VE public key
(represented by the place IDP RECV ONE TIME VE PUB KEY, and the ciphertext
of the user’s PII (represented by the place IDP RECV PII VE CIPHER).
Following this, the user and the IdP both engage in the PK-VE operation (rep-
resented by the transition IDP U PK PII VE CIPHER). This transition captures
the T-PE-3 messages. The output of this transition is a boolean value represent-
ing the result of executing the PK-VE operation: if it is true, then the IdP is
convinced that the given ciphertext correctly encrypts the user’s PII under the
given conditions and public key.
Key Modeling Techniques In this page, we propose several techniques to model
the commonly used cryptographic operations in not only PESPs protocols, but
also other protocol that apply cryptographic primitives: message signature and
verification, message encryption, zero-knowledge proof protocol, and generation
of one-time data.
Message signature and verification is commonly used by a message recipient
to verify that the message received has not been modified in transit (message
integirty), and to verify that the message is indeed sent by the claimed mes-
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sage sender (message authenticity). Line 1-4 of Table 2 show an example of how
we could build the colour definition for signed messages. First, we define the
colour for the message to be signed (line 1). Next, we define the signature of the
message. A signature is represented as a tuplet consisting of the message itself,
and the signature key (line 2-3). To anticipate the use of more complex signa-
ture algorithm, we also include the provability property as part of the signature
tuplet.4 Having defined the message and the signature, we can now define the
colour of a signed message, which is simply a tuplet consisting of the message
and its signature (line 4).
Having defined the colour representing a signed message, we now need to
express its corresponding operations: message signing and verification. These
operations are encapsulated in two functions as shown in Table 3. The func-
tion sign takes two parameters: a message to sign, and a signature key. The
output is a record representing a message signature. The function verify takes
two parameters: a signed message, and a signature verification key. To capture
the verification of the integrity of a message, it is sufficient to compare the
plaintext message in the signed message with the actual message being signed
(encapsulated within the message signature). To capture the verification of the
authenticity of the message, it si sufficient to compare the key used to sign the
message (again, encapsulated within the message signature) with the signature
verification key corresponding to the claimed message source. If both of these
comparisons succeed, then we have verified the integrity and authenticity of the
message. The verify function can be used as a guard to a transition to capture
the situation whereby a protocol halts prematurely if a signature verification
fail. This is precisely how it is being used as depicted in Figure 4.2 (note the
guard function for transition U STORES PSEUDONYM).
1 fun sign(msg:MSG, signKey:K_SIGN_GEN) =
2 {message=msg, key=signKey, provable=false};
3
4 fun verify(sigMSG:SIGNED_MSG, verifyKey:K_VERIFY_GEN)=
5 #message(sigMSG) = #message(#signat(sigMSG)) andalso
6 #key(#signat(sigMSG)) = verifyKey;
Table 3: Capturing Message Signature and Verification
To represent a VE ciphertext, we have defined an appropriate colour (line
15-16 of Table 2). A VE encryption is a record consisting of four fields: the
message itself, the public encryption key, the label under which the message is
4 Normally, in order to verify a signature, a message recipient needs both plaintext
value of the message and the signature. When a signature has the provable property, a
message recipient does not learn the value of the message nor the signature; however,
the message recipient can still verify that the message sender knows some valid
messages that have been signed by a known entity.
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encrypted, and the provability property. A provable ciphertext means that the
recipietn of the message can be convicned that the received ciphertext correctly
encrypts some claimed value (in this case the user’s PII) without the recipient
learning the value of the PII itself nor of the decryption key - also known as zero-
knowledge proof (PK). We treat the message field inside a record representing a
ciphertext to be unreadable.
The operations related to VE ciphertext include the message encryption and
decryption, and PK-VE. The encryption and decryption operations are encapsu-
lated in two function called veEnc and decVE respectively (see Table 4). The
encryption function takes three parameters: the message to encrypt, the pub-
lic encryption key, and the label under which the message is to be encrypted,
and it simply returning a record representing a ciphertext as defined by the
colour CIPHER VE PII, setting the provability property to ‘true’ as this encryp-
tion algorithm allows its content to be proven in a zero-knowledge manner. The
decryption function takes three parameters: the VE ciphertext, the decryption
key, and the encryption label. First, it checks if the decryption key is a correct
key (by comparing it with the encryption key encapsulated in the ciphertext).
Next, it checks if the label used to decrypt is the same as the label used during
the encryption time. If so, a decryption will succeed, and thus, the content of
the message can be extracted (represented as the output of the function).
Next, to capture the PK property, we encapsulate it in a transition IDP U
PK PII VE CIPHER. Note that all of the input places connected to this transi-
tion represent the required data at both the user side (right hand side of the
transition) and the IdP side (left hand side of the transition). The behaviour
of this PK-VE is captured in the output inscription arc from this transition to
the place IDP U PK PII VE CIPHER. This arc inscription captures the essentials
verification that a valid PK-VE should verify; for example, the arc inscription
verifies that the encrypted data inside the ciphertext (which is unreadable to
the IdP) contains the same PII as what is inside a valid user’s certificate (line 7
Table 5). The output of such an operation can be used as a guard to a transition
which should not be executed if the PK-VE operation fails. In other words, the
result is used to halt the execution of a protocol prematurely as depicted by the
guard function in the transition IDP GENERATES STORES PSEUDONYM AND SEND
TO USER.
1 fun veEnc(msg:PII, pubKey:K_PUB_VE, cond:LABEL)=
2 {message=msg, key=pubKey, label=cond, provable=true};
3
4 fun decVE(key:K_PRIV_VE, cipherVE:CIPHER_VE_PII, cond:LABEL)=
5 if key=(#key(cipherVE)) andalso cond = (#label(cipherVE)) then
6 1‘(#message(cipherVE)) else empty;
Table 4: Capturing Message Encryption and Decryption
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1 if #provable(idpVeCipher) andalso
2 #provable(cert) andalso
3 #signKey(cert) = #certVerifyKey(
4 #verifyKeys(readIDPRecord("idp.txt"))) andalso
5 #message(idpCommitment) = #pii(cert) andalso
6 #message(idpVeCipher) = #message(idpCommitment) andalso
7 #message(idpVeCipher) = #pii(cert) andalso
8 idpVeKey = #key(idpVeCipher) andalso
9 idpGenCond = #label(idpVeCipher) then 1‘true
10 else 1‘false
Table 5: Capturing PK-VE Behaviours
Finally, in this page, we also propose a technique to ensure that we can gen-
erate one-time data in a simple manner and the generated data is guaranteed
to be unique. Figure 6 shows the process of generating one-time data that are
subsequently used for other operations (such as the generation of a VE cipher-
text). Our approach is simply to encapsulate the generation of one-time data
in a function with the help of a text file. This text file stores the next valid
one-time data. When this data is used, we then update the file with the next
valid one-time data (by simply incrementing it by 1), and so on. See Table 5 for
the detail of the function. By using this function, at any point in the model, we
only have to call the function to obtain a unique one-time data that has never
been used before.
1 fun getRandom() =
2 let
3 val random_file = TextIO.openIn("random1.txt")
4 val count = TextIO.inputLine(random_file)
5 val _ = TextIO.closeIn(random_file)
6 val update = valOf(Int.fromString(count)) + 1
7 val random_file2 = TextIO.openOut("random1.txt")
8 val _ = TextIO.output(random_file2, Int.toString(update))
9 val _ = TextIO.closeOut(random_file2)
10 in
11 count
12 end;
Table 6: Get one-time data function
KE Page for PIEMC without trusted ARM Figure 4.2 shows the KE page
model. The message NT-KE-1 is represented by the transition TPM GENERATES
AIK KEY SIGNED SESSION KEY AND DAA PROOFS. We do not model the details
of a DAA protocol as we are only concerned with the output of such a protocol:
convincing the IdP that the user is using a valid TPM module without learning
the permanent identity of the TPM device itself - see Section 3.2. Instead, a two
sets of signing and verification keys representing the TPM device are produced:
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true
true
signedSPResponse
uchveCipher1
result
idpTpmProof
signedTPMProof
uchveCipher1
signedTPMProof
signedTPMProof
uchveCipher1 tpmProof
daaProof
true
result
[result]
U SENDS ARM
MODULE 1 RESULT
AND TPM PROOF
TPM GENERATES 
CORRECT 
EXECUTION PROOF
[#message(uchveCipher1)<>0 orelse USER_ATTACK3]
input (uchveCipher1, tpmProof);
output (signedTPMProof);
action
let
val userRec = readUserRecord("user.txt")
val aikKey = #privAIK(#tpmKeys(userRec))
val completeTPMProof = if not USER_ATTACK3 andalso not USER_ATTACK4 then 
CIPHER_UCHVE_KVE.mkstr(uchveCipher1)^tpmProof else
 CIPHER_UCHVE_KVE.mkstr(uchveCipher1)^"arbitraryTPMProof"
val sigTPMProof = sign(completeTPMProof, aikKey)
val signedTPMProof = {message=completeTPMProof, 
signat = sigTPMProof}
in
 signedTPMProof
end;
TPM EXECUTES
MODULE 2
[result]
input ();
output (uchveCipher1);
action
let
 val userRec = readUserRecord("user.txt")
 val groupKeys = if not USER_ATTACK3 then #uchvePubKeys(userRec)
 else [7,8,9]
val msg = if not USER_ATTACK3 then #priv(#veKeys(userRec)) else 0
val desigMembers = if not USER_ATTACK3 then #desigMembers(userRec) else [7,8,9]
val k = if not USER_ATTACK3 then #k(userRec) else 99
val t = if not USER_ATTACK3 then length (#desigMembers(userRec)) else 99
val n = if not USER_ATTACK3 then length (#uchvePubKeys(userRec)) else 99
val label = if not USER_ATTACK4 then #conditions1(#conditions(userRec)) else
 "hardToFulfillConditions"
 
val pub = #pub(#veKeys(userRec))
 val correct = msg = pub
 
val uchveCipher1 = if not (USER_ATTACK4 orelse USER_ATTACK3)
 then uchveEnc(msg, groupKeys, correct, desigMembers, t, k, n, label) else
 {message=msg, groupKeys=groupKeys, desigMembers=desigMembers,
 t=t,k=k, n=n,label=label,provable=true}
in
 uchveCipher1
end;
[result]
CAN START
MODULE 2
BOOL
BOOL
SIGNED_SP_RESPONSE
SIGNED_SP_RESPONSE
BOOL
CIPHER_UCHVE_KVE
SIGNED_MSG
"Module2PCRValue"
STRING
SIGNED
TPM PROOF
SIGNED_MSG
TPM PROOF
DATA
STRING
TPM GENERATED
CIPHER UCHVE
KVE
CIPHER_UCHVE_KVE
STRING
K_PUB_TPM
BOOL
BOOL
result
RESPONSE FROM
IDP RECEIVED
[verify(
 signedTPMProof, 
#aikVerifyKey(
#verifyKeys(
readIDPRecord(
"idp.txt"))))]
input (uchveCipher1, idpTpmProof, signedTPMProof);
output (result);
action
let
val idpRec = readIDPRecord("idp.txt")
val uchveCipherIDP = #cipherUCHVE1(idpRec)
val idpProof = 
CIPHER_UCHVE_KVE.mkstr(uchveCipher1)^
idpTpmProof^
#conditions1(#idpConditions(idpRec))^
K_PUB_UCHVE_LIST.mkstr (#groupKeys(uchveCipherIDP))^
THRESHOLD.mkstr (#k(uchveCipherIDP))^
INT.mkstr(#t(uchveCipherIDP))^
INT.mkstr(#n(uchveCipherIDP))
val result = #message(signedTPMProof) = idpProof
in
 result
end;
uchveCipher1
SP1 VERIFIES AND
STORES RESPONSE
KEY ESCROW
COMPLETEOut
[(#message(signedSPResponse)) =
 (#message(#signat(signedSPResponse))) andalso
 (#key(#signat(signedSPResponse))) =
 #idpVerifyKey(readSPRecord("sp1.txt"))
]
"Module2PCRValue"^
(#label(uchveCipher1))^
K_PUB_UCHVE_LIST.mkstr (
#groupKeys(uchveCipher1))^
THRESHOLD.mkstr (
#k(uchveCipher1))^
INT.mkstr(#t(uchveCipher1))^
INT.mkstr(#n(uchveCipher1))
input (aikKey, signedSesKey);
output (result);
action
let 
val idpRec = readIDPRecord("idp.txt") 
val sessKey = #message(signedSesKey)
 val result = #message(signedSesKey) = 
#message(#signat(signedSesKey)) andalso
 #key(#signat(signedSesKey)) = aikKey
 val verifyKeys = #verifyKeys(idpRec)
 val verifyKeys = VERIFY_KEYS.set_aikVerifyKey verifyKeys aikKey
 val verifyKeys = VERIFY_KEYS.set_sessionVerifyKey verifyKeys sessKey
 val idpRec = IDP_RECORD.set_verifyKeys idpRec verifyKeys
 val idpRec = updateIDPRecord("idp.txt", idpRec)
in
 result
end;
input (uchveCipher1);
output (signedSPResponse);
action
let
 val idpRec = readIDPRecord("idp.txt")
 val idpRec = IDP_RECORD.set_cipherUCHVE1 idpRec uchveCipher1
 val signKey = #signKey(idpRec)
 val idpRec = updateIDPRecord("idp.txt", idpRec)
 
val idpRec = readIDPRecord("idp.txt")
 val thepseudo = #pseudo(idpRec)
 val thecipherVE = #cipherVE(idpRec)
 val thecipherUCHVE = #cipherUCHVE1(idpRec)
 val signKey = #signKey(idpRec)
 val spResponse = {pseudo=thepseudo, cipherVE=thecipherVE,cipherUCHVE=thecipherUCHVE}
 val spResponseSig = {message=spResponse, key=signKey, provable=false}
 val signedSPResponse = {message=spResponse, signat=spResponseSig}
in
 signedSPResponse
end;
input ();
output (idpRec);
action
let 
val idpRec = readIDPRecord("idp.txt")
in
 idpRec
end;
input ();
output (aikKey);
action
let
 val aikKey = valOf(Int.fromString(getRandom()))
 val sessionKey = valOf(Int.fromString(getRandom()))
 val userRec = readUserRecord("user.txt")
 val aikKeys = #tpmKeys(userRec)
 val aikKeys = K_TPM.set_pubAIK aikKeys aikKey
 val aikKeys = K_TPM.set_privAIK aikKeys aikKey
 val userRec = USER_RECORD.set_tpmKeys userRec aikKeys
 val userRec = USER_RECORD.set_sessionSignKey userRec sessionKey
 val userRec = updateUserRecord("user.txt", userRec)
in
 aikKey
end;
aikKey
SIGNED_SESSIONKEY
result
signedSPResponse
signedSPResponse
input (signedSPResponse);
output ();
action
let
 val spRec = readSPRecord("sp1.txt")
 val spResponse = #message(signedSPResponse)
 val pseudo = #pseudo(spResponse)
 val cipherVE = #cipherVE(spResponse)
 val cipherUCHVE = #cipherUCHVE(spResponse)
 val spRec = SP_RECORD.set_pseudo spRec pseudo
 val spRec = SP_RECORD.set_cipherVE spRec cipherVE
 val spRec = SP_RECORD.set_cipherUCHVE spRec cipherUCHVE
in
 updateSPRecord("sp1.txt", spRec)
end;
{message=(
#sessionSignKey(
readUserRecord(
"user.txt"))), 
signat={
 message = (#
sessionSignKey(
 readUserRecord(
"user.txt"))),
 key = aikKey, 
provable=false}}
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Fig. 7: KE page
a set of attestation identity key (AIK) keys (used to sign messages generated
from within the TPM device), and a set of s s ion eys (to sign other messages).
These two sets of keys are used throughout the PIEMC protocol.
After establishing the use of correct TPM device, the user’s TPM starts the
execution of Module2 to produce a UCHVE of K PRIV VE (represented by the
transition TPM GENERATED CIPHER UCHVE KVE. After the execution of Module2,
the user’s TPM device generates a proof of correct execution (represented by
the transition TPM GEN RATES CORRECT EXECUTION PROOF) which is signed us-
ing the TPM AIK key. Message NT-KE-2 is represented by the sending of the
UCHVE of K PRIV VE and the corresponding TPM proof to the IdP (note the
two outgoing arc from the transition U SENDS ARM MODULE 1 R SULT AND TPM
PROOF).
Upon receiving the UCHVE of K PRIV VE and the proof, the IdP verifies
the given encryption and the proof (represented by the transition IDP VERIFIES
MODULE 2 TPM PROOF). If it succeeds, it then prepares a response essa e to th
SP1 (represented by the transition IDP STORES AND PREPARES SP RESPONSE).
Message NT-KE-3 is represented by a colour SIGNED SP RESPONSE (see Table
2).
Key Modeling Technique In this page, the key modeling technique rop sed is the
representation of the TPM module execution with provable execution property
[16]. What is of interest is how we could represent the generation and verification
of TPM correct module execution as this is one of the crucial operations on which
the security properties of our protocol depend.
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In general, the proof of a correct module execution is represented by three
factors: a TPM-signed representation of the input, output, and the module code-
base that reside in the protected TPM registry. Therefore, in the generation of
the proof, we use a multi-step approach. The registry value for Module2 code
and its input are represented in the variable tpmProof which is form as follows
(note the output arc from the transition TPM EXECUTES MODULE 2 to the place
TPM PROOF DATA:
– the Module2 registry value is represented as a simple ”Module2PCRValue”
string,
– for each of the input to Module2, we obtain its string representation (using
the built-in COLOUR.mkstr function), then
– we concatenate all of the above string to obtain the first part of the proof.
The next piece of the proof requires the output of Module2, therefore, we
need to execute Module2 first before we can form the complete proof. After
executing Module2 (represented by the transition TPM EXECUTES MODULE2 and
its corresponding code region shown in Table 7 top part), we obtain the out-
put: the UCHVE of K PRIV VE. We then proceed to form the complete TPM
proof by concatenating tpmProof with the String representation of the UCHVE
of K PRIV VE. The complete TPM proof is then signed using the TPM AIK
signing key. The operation of forming and signing the TPM proof is performed
by the code region linked to the transition TPM GENERATES CORRECT EXECUTION
PROOF - see Table 7 - bottom part.
The signed TPM proof as well as the output from Module2 are then sent to
the IdP as represented by the transition U SENDS IDP MODULE 2 RESULT AND
TPM PROOF.
Upon receiving the UCHVE of K PRIV VE and the corresponding TPM
proof, the IdP then proceeds to verify if the proof is correct. To do so, the IdP
has to first verify if the correctness of the signed TPM proof. If so, it then needs
to verify that the TPM proof is similar to the one that it generates independently.
Based on the details provided in [16], a verifier can generate a valid TPM proof
as follows: the Module2 code base and input to Module2 are known to the IdP.
Therefore, to represent the generation of a valid TPM proof, the IdP only has
to concatenate the Module2 code base registry value (represented as a string
”Module2PCRValue”) with the input values that it knows and the received string
representation of UCHVE of K PRIV VE. If the generated TPM proof is the
same as the one received, then the IdP is convinced that the received UCHVE
of K PRIV VE is valid.
MC page For completion, the MC page for the PIEMC protocol without trusted
ARM is provided in Figure 8.
Revocation page for PIEMC without trusted ARM Figure 9 shows the
model for the Revocation stage. The revocation stage starts when one of the
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1 Code region for transition TPM EXECUTES MODULE 2:
2 input ();
3 output (uchveCipher1);
4 action
5 let
6 val userRec = readUserRecord("user.txt")
7 val groupKeys = if not USER_ATTACK3 then #uchvePubKeys(userRec)
8 else [7,8,9]
9 val msg = if not USER_ATTACK3 then #priv(#veKeys(userRec)) else 0
10 val desigMembers = if not USER_ATTACK3 then #desigMembers(userRec) else [7,8,9]
11 val k = if not USER_ATTACK3 then #k(userRec) else 99
12 val t = if not USER_ATTACK3 then length (#desigMembers(userRec)) else 99
13 val n = if not USER_ATTACK3 then length (#uchvePubKeys(userRec)) else 99
14 val label = if not USER_ATTACK4 then #conditions1(#conditions(userRec)) else
15 "hardToFulfillConditions"
16
17 val pub = #pub(#veKeys(userRec))
18 val correct = msg = pub
19
20 val uchveCipher1 = if not (USER_ATTACK4 orelse USER_ATTACK3)
21 then uchveEnc(msg, groupKeys, correct, desigMembers, t, k, n, label) else
22 {message=msg, groupKeys=groupKeys, desigMembers=desigMembers,
23 t=t,k=k, n=n,label=label,provable=true}
24 in
25 uchveCipher1
26 end;
27
28 Code region for transition TPM GENERATES CORRECT EXECUTION PROOF:
29 input (uchveCipher1, tpmProof);
30 output (signedTPMProof);
31 action
32 let
33 val userRec = readUserRecord("user.txt")
34 val aikKey = #privAIK(#tpmKeys(userRec))
35 val completeTPMProof = if not USER_ATTACK3 andalso not USER_ATTACK4 then
36 CIPHER_UCHVE_KVE.mkstr(uchveCipher1)^tpmProof else
37 CIPHER_UCHVE_KVE.mkstr(uchveCipher1)^"arbitraryTPMProof"
38 val sigTPMProof = sign(completeTPMProof, aikKey)
39 val signedTPMProof = {message=completeTPMProof,
40 signat = sigTPMProof}
41 in
42 signedTPMProof
43 end;
Table 7: Module2 Execution and Generating TPM proof
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Fig. 8: MC page - PIEMC without trusted ARM
REFEREESSERVICE PROVIDER1
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vePriv
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true
if not SP_ATTACK3 then 
(#conditions(readSPRecord("sp1_sess1.txt")) ) else
"EasyToFulfillConditions"
revokeReq
[fulfilled]
input ();
output (refRec);
action
let
 val refRec = readREFRecord("ref3.txt")
in 
refRec
end;
[fulfilled]
input (signedDecReq);
output ();
action
let
 val refRec = readREFRecord("ref2.txt")
 val piece = #uchvePiece(#message(signedDecReq))
 val cond = #conditions(#message(signedDecReq))
 val refRec = REF_RECORD.set_conditions refRec cond
 val refRec = REF_RECORD.set_uchvePiece refRec piece
in
 updateREFRecord("ref2.txt", refRec)
end;
input (signedDecReq);
output ();
action
let
 val refRec = readREFRecord("ref3.txt")
 val piece = #uchvePiece(#message(signedDecReq))
 val cond = #conditions(#message(signedDecReq))
 val refRec = REF_RECORD.set_conditions refRec cond
 val refRec = REF_RECORD.set_uchvePiece refRec piece
in
 updateREFRecord("ref3.txt", refRec)
end;
input (revokeReq);
output (signedDecReqList);
action
let
 val sp1Rec = readSPRecord("sp1_sess1.txt")
 val uchveCipher1 = #cipherUCHVE(sp1Rec)
 val piece1 = {conditions=(#message(revokeReq)), uchvePiece=convertToUCHVEPiece(uchveCipher1,1)}
 val piece2 = {conditions=(#message(revokeReq)), uchvePiece=convertToUCHVEPiece(uchveCipher1,2)}
 val piece3 = {conditions=(#message(revokeReq)), uchvePiece=convertToUCHVEPiece(uchveCipher1,3)}
 val signKey = #signKey(sp1Rec)
 val sig1 = {message=piece1, key=signKey, provable=false}
 val sig2 = {message=piece2, key=signKey, provable=false}
 val sig3 = {message=piece3, key=signKey, provable=false}
 val signedUCHVE1 = {message=piece1, signat=sig1}
 val signedUCHVE2 = {message=piece2, signat=sig2}
 val signedUCHVE3 = {message=piece3, signat=sig3}
 val signedDecReqList = [signedUCHVE1, signedUCHVE2, signedUCHVE3]
in
 signedDecReqList
end;
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Fig. 9: Revocation Page for PIEMC without trusted ARM
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service providers (in this case SP1) discovers that some conditions are satis-
fied. The message NT-REV-1 is represented as a colour of type SIGNED DEC REQ
and is sent from SP1 to all referees involved (transition SP1 SIGNS FULFILLED
CONDITIONS). We model three referees in this page.
Upon receiving the message, each referee verifies if the condition string sent
by SP1 earlier has been satisfied. Whether the conditions are fulfilled or not
is parameterized in two parameters: fulfilled and condActually (see Table
2). The differences between these two parameters relate to the assumed attack
behaviours from the referees which are explained later. When each of the referees
believe that the conditions are fulfilled, it then proceeds to decrypt the given
ciphertext pieces, and send the decrypt3d pieces to SP1 (this corresponds to
message NT-REV-2 in Figure 3. If SP1 receives t or more decrypted pieces, it can
then recover K PRIV VE and proceed to decrypt CIPHER VE PII to obtain
the user’s PII.
Key Modeling Technique The main modeling technique introduced in this page
is the representation of operations involved in the decryption of threshold en-
cryption (such as the UCHVE). As stated earlier in Section 3.1, we repre-
sent group encryption ciphertext in two forms: CIPHER UCHVE KVE and
CIPHER UCHVE KVE PIECE. Dealing with the individual pieces of a group
ciphertext could complicate the model, and therefore, we have only been repre-
senting such an ecnryption in its group form. However, during the decryption
process, we need to represent such an encryption in its individual pieces, each
to be sent to its corresponding referee. Therefore, we introduce a conversion
function that converts the group representation of such a ciphertext to its cor-
responding individual pieces - as shown in Table 8.
Next, we provide a place to store all of the decrypted ciphertext pieces. At
this point, we are only concern on the quantity of decrypted pieces available,
and thus, the decrypted ciphertext can be sufficiently represented by a simple
primitive, such as a boolean value with ‘true’ representing successful decryp-
tion, and ‘false’ representing failed decryption (as described in Section 3.1, only
designated referees can successfully decrypt a ciphertext piece).
After receiving the decryption response from each of the referees (success
or failure), the SP1 needs to filter out those successful decrypted pieces from
those failed ones (represented by the transition SP1 FILTERS DECRYPT RESULT.
After isolating the successful decryption pieces, it then checks if it has at least
t number of such pieces. If so, it can then proceed to recover the data hidden
in the group ciphertext. Such process is captured by the input arc inscription
from teh place UCHVE PIECE DECRYPT SUCCESS to the transition SP1 RECOVERS
VE PRIVATE KEY whereby only when there are t tokens in the mentioned place
will the corresponding transition be enabled.
This modeling technique takes advantage of the CPN capability to easily
capture the boundedness property of an operation. More precisely, in this sce-
nario, the boundedness property is directly translated to the threshold property
which commonly exists in many cryptographic primitives used in PESPs or other
security protocols in general.
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1 fun convertToUCHVEPiece(uchve:CIPHER_UCHVE_KVE, refPubKey:K_PUB_UCHVE) =
2 {message=(#message(uchve)), key= refPubKey,
3 label=(#label(uchve)), isDesignated=List.exists (fn y => refPubKey=y) (#desigMembers(uchve))}
Table 8: Converting group ciphertext form to individual ciphertext form
Capturing Session Data Common to many security protocols, not limited to
PESPs, when there are several message exchanges between various entities, it
is important that we keep track of the data being exchanged and store them in
such manner that they can be retrieved easily. In modeling the PIEMC protocol,
we propose the use of text files as the method to keep track of the session data
being exchanged in a session. To allow easy access to these text files, we propose
the following approach:
– Decide on the data that needs to be stored by each entity from each session,
– translate those data into one or more CPN colour of type record (preferably
one colour type for each entity) (for example, see Table 9 top part),
– create a function that reads a text file into a CPN variable of some record
type as defined earlier (see Table 9 - middle part),
– when necessary, the fields of the record (now represented as a CPN variable)
should be updated based on some received or generated data (see Table 10
- top part),
– create a function that allows the updated CPN variable to be written back
to the relevant text file (see Table 9 - bottom part).
– At the end of each session, dump the session variable (holing the session
data) into a new file representing an archive of a session data before starting
a new session (see Table 10 bottom part).
Using the above mechanism, one could easily read, store, and update session
data throughout the session without having to maintain tokens in various places
across multiple CPN pages. This also reduces the need to do the ‘vacuum cleaner’
functionality at the end of each session to remove session tokens from the relevant
places. Such ‘vacuum cleaner’ functionality is known to be inefficient in a petri
net model [27].
Adding attack model There are numerous types of attacks that one could
think of in order to attack a protocol. In our model, we limit ourselves to mod-
eling those attacks that originate from legitimate entities as opposed to those
from external entities. Our approach to modeling attacker behaviour is to pa-
rameterize them such that we can switch certain attack on or off depending on
the configuration. We have modeled about 15 different attacks originating from
either the user, SP, ARM, and referees (see Table 2). In this section, we elabo-
rate several attack models that we have included in the PE page, KE page, and
the revocation page.
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1 colset USER_RECORD = record pseudo:STRING * pii:PII * cert:CERTIFICATE *
2 conditions:USER_CONDITIONS * sessionSignKey:K_SIGN_GEN * tpmKeys:K_TPM *
3 veKeys:K_VE * uchvePubKeys:K_PUB_UCHVE_LIST * desigMembers:DESIG_MEMBERS_LIST *
4 k:THRESHOLD * verifyKeys:USER_VERIFY_KEYS declare set;
5
6 fun readUserRecord(file:STRING)=
7 let
8 val ins = TextIO.openIn(file)
9 val userRec = USER_RECORD.input(ins)
10 val _ = TextIO.closeIn(ins)
11 in
12 userRec
13 end;
14
15 fun updateUserRecord(file:STRING, userRec:USER_RECORD) =
16 let
17 val os = TextIO.openOut(file)
18 val _ = USER_RECORD.output (os, userRec)
19 in
20 TextIO.closeOut(os)
21 end;
Table 9: Functions to read and update session data
1 Code region for transition \texttt{SP1 VERIFIES AND STORES RESPONSE} (from page \ac{KE}) :
2 input (signedSPResponse);
3 output ();
4 action
5 let
6 val spRec = readSPRecord("sp1.txt")
7 val spResponse = #message(signedSPResponse)
8 val pseudo = #pseudo(spResponse)
9 val cipherVE = #cipherVE(spResponse)
10 val cipherUCHVE = #cipherUCHVE(spResponse)
11 val spRec = SP_RECORD.set_pseudo spRec pseudo
12 val spRec = SP_RECORD.set_cipherVE spRec cipherVE
13 val spRec = SP_RECORD.set_cipherUCHVE spRec cipherUCHVE
14 in
15 updateSPRecord("sp1.txt", spRec)
16 end;
17
18 Code region for transition \texttt{STORE SESSION DATA} (from the main \ac{PIEMC} page) :
19 input (counter);
20 output ();
21 action
22 let
23 val userRec = readUserRecord("user.txt")
24 val idpRec = readIDPRecord("idp.txt")
25 val armRec = readARMRecord("arm.txt")
26 val sp1Rec = readSPRecord("sp1.txt")
27 val sp2Rec = readSPRecord("sp2.txt")
28 val _ = updateUserRecord("user_sess"^Int.toString(counter-1)^".txt", userRec)
29 val _ = updateIDPRecord("idp_sess"^Int.toString(counter-1)^".txt", idpRec)
30 val _ = updateArmRecord("arm_sess"^Int.toString(counter-1)^".txt", armRec)
31 val _ = updateSPRecord("sp1_sess"^Int.toString(counter-1)^".txt", sp1Rec)
32 in
33 updateSPRecord("sp2_sess"^Int.toString(counter-1)^".txt", sp2Rec)
34 end;
Table 10: The process of of reading, modifying, updating, and storing session data
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PE Attack Model In this page, there are several parameterized attacks included.
See the list of parameter declaration in Table 2. In this paper, we show two
examples of attacks:
– USER ATTACK1: user gives incorrect encrypted PII and conditions during
PE stage. This attack is expressed in Figure 6 as arc expression from the
transition U GENERATES PII CIPHER to the place PII VE CIPHER.
– USER ATTACK2: user gives incorrect VE public key to the IdP. This attack
is expressed in Figure 4.2 as an arc expression from the transition U SENDS
PII ESCROW DATA to the place IDP RECV ONE TIME VE PUB KEY.
KE Attack Model In relation to this page, there are several parameterized attack
modeled:
– USER ATTACK3: a user executes Module2 under incorrect parameters nec-
essary for a correct UCHVE of K PRIV VE, and
– USER ATTACK4: a user could execute Module2 and bind the encryption
with a set of conditions Cond1 which are different from the originally agreed
conditions Cond1 and are difficult or impossible to fulfill.
The above two attacks are expressed in the code region for the transitions TPM
EXECUTES MODULE 2 and TPM GENERATES CORRECT EXECUTION PROOF - see Ta-
ble 7.
Revocation Page Attack Model There are several attack behaviours that we have
parameterized into the model at the KE page. We assume that Referee 1 and
Referee 3 are malicious, while Referee2 is honest. The value fulfilled refers
to the decision that a referee made regarding the (non-)fulfillment of a given
condition. The value condActually refers to the actual (non-)fulfillment of some
conditions. Several attacks are elaborated here:
– REF ATTACK1: Referees agree that a condition is fulfilled while it is not.
This attack is expressed in the declaration of the constant fulfilled (see
Table 2): when this attack is enabled, then we set the value of fulfilled
to true regardless of the value condActually. Thus, this has the effect of
malicious referee 1 and 3 to return a ‘true’ value as an output from the tran-
sition REF1 VERIFY CONDITIONS FULFILLMENT - which subsequently means
enable the decryption of the given ciphertext piece. The honest referee 2, on
the other hand, always returns the actual (non)-fulfillment of the conditions
as set by the parameter condActually.
– REF ATTACK2: Referees collude among themselves to recover K PRIV VE.
This attack is expressed in the arc expression from the transition REF1
DECRYPTS AND SENDS UCHVE PIECE and REF3 DECRYPTS AND SENDS UCHVE
PIECE to the place REFEREES UCHVE PIECES DECRYPT EXTRA COPY to mimic
the action of malicious referees colluding with each other in an attempt to
recover K PRIV VE.
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– SP ATTACK3: SP1/SP2/IDP attempts to start revocation stage using wrong
easy-to-fulfill conditions. This action is reflected in the arc expression from
the transition SP1 RETRIEVES FULFILLED CONDITIONS to the place CONDITIONS
FULFILLED. Of course, when this attack is modeled, we need to set the value
of condActually to ‘true’.
– SP ATTACK4: SP1/SP2/IDP attempts to start revocation stage using cor-
rect but not fulfilled conditions. When this attack is modeled, the value of
fulfilled and condActually is thus set to ‘false’ (see Table 2).
Other Attacks There are other types of attacks which have been parameterized
into the model, but are not detailed in this paper:
– SP ATTACK1: SP1 uses easy-to-fulfill conditions that were not agreed prior
with the user during PE stage.
– SP ATTACK11:SP1 uses easy-to-fulfill conditions that were not agreed prior
with the user during KE stage.
– SP ATTACK12:SP1 uses other non-agreed UCHVE parameters
– SP ATTACK2: SP2 uses easy-to-fulfill conditions that were not agreed prior
with the user.
– SP ATTACK22:SP2 uses other non-agreed UCHVE parameters
– SP ATTACK5: SP1 uses invalid signature key to sign SP1 request message
during PE stage
– SP ATTACK6: SP2 uses invalid signature key to sign SP2 request message
during MC stage
5 Model Validation
Before we start performing security behaviour verification, we firstly need to
perform model validation. There are several basic properties that we need to
verify to ensure that the PIEMCmodel is a faithful representation of the protocol
specification. To do so, there are seven basic properties that we need to verify for
the PIEMC without trusted ARM. For completeness, each of these properties is
detailed, along with the corresponding session data and/or state-space analysis
queries.
5.1 Property-1
This property establishes the correctness of users’ behaviours which is as follow:
users users should generate correct one-time VE key pair, correct conditions
upon which user’s PII can be revoked, correct VE encryption of the PII, and
correct UCHVE encryption (and their corrresponding re-encryptions) of the VE
private key.
Specifically, we define ‘correct’ values as follows (for both session 1 and session
2):
– a one-time VE key pair is correct if the values of both the public and private
keys are the same (represented as an integer value),
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– to represent correct conditions, we require that the value of the condi-
tion string to be in the format of: ”Conditions SP”<SP Identifier: 1 or
2><random one-time number that is greater than 0>
– to represent a correct encryption of user PII, we require that the value of the
‘message’ field of the user generated VE cipher contains the same value as
the one in the user’s certificate, and that the key and label used to encrypt
the PII is the same as the ones generated
– to represent correct encryption of VE private key, the message contained in
the UCHVE encryption as a result of execution of Module2 must contain
the correct VE private key as generated by the user, and that the key for
such a UCHVE encryption must be the value of the condition string for SP1
and SP2 (for session 1 and 2 respectively)
This property can be verified using a combination of session-data analysis
and state-space analysis as shown in Table 5.1.
5.2 Property-2
Property-2 is about verifying the correctness of the PE stage. Assuming that
Proeprty-1 holds, at the end of PE stage (for both session 1 and session 2), a
valid model of the protocol has to be in the following states:
– state2-1: the IDP must have a correct VE cipher of the user PII - which is
consistent with the one that user generated earlier,
– state2-2: the IDP must have the correct one-time per session VE public
key that the user generated,
– state2-3: the IDP must have the correct condition string for SP1 that is
consistent with the one agreed between user and SP1,
– state2-4: the PK PII VE operation must not fail (given that we do not any
malicious behaviours yet), and
– state2-5: a unique one-time session-pseudonym must be generated by IDP
and correctly saved by the user.
This property is verified using a combination of session-data and state-space
analysis as shown in Table 12
5.3 Property-3
Property-3 establishes the correctness of the KE stage. Assuming that Property-
1 holds, at the end of the KE stage (for both session 1 and session 2) the protocol
should be at the following states:
– state3-1: the ARM msut have received correct public AIK key, as well as
correct public signature verification session key from the user’s TPM
– state3-2: the DAA operation must not fail (given that we do not consider
the use of corrupted TPM in which ase the DAA operation will fail),
Modeling and Verification of Privacy Enhancing Security Protocols 31
1 val os = TextIO.openOut("property1.txt")
2 fun checkConditions(cond:STRING) =
3 (substring(cond, 0, 14) = "Conditions SP1" orelse
4 substring(cond, 0, 14) = "Conditions SP2") andalso
5 valOf(Int.fromString(substring(cond, 14, (String.size(cond) - 14)))) > 0
6 val userRec1 = readUserRecord("user_sess1.txt")
7 val userRec2 = readUserRecord("user_sess2.txt")
8 val sameKey1 = #pub(#veKeys(userRec1)) = #priv(#veKeys(userRec1))
9 val sameKey2 = #pub(#veKeys(userRec2)) = #priv(#veKeys(userRec2))
10 val keyOK = sameKey1 andalso sameKey2
11 val cond1_1 = #conditions1(#conditions(userRec1))
12 val cond2_1 = #conditions2(#conditions(userRec1))
13 val cond1_2 = #conditions1(#conditions(userRec2))
14 val cond2_2 = #conditions2(#conditions(userRec2))
15 val condOK11 = checkConditions(cond1_1)
16 val condOK21 = checkConditions(cond2_1)
17 val condOK12 = checkConditions(cond1_2)
18 val condOK22 = checkConditions(cond2_2)
19 val random1 = valOf(Int.fromString(substring(cond1_1, 14, (String.size(cond1_1) - 14))))
20 val random2 = valOf(Int.fromString(substring(cond2_1, 14, (String.size(cond2_1) - 14))))
21 val random3 = valOf(Int.fromString(substring(cond1_2, 14, (String.size(cond1_2) - 14))))
22 val random4 = valOf(Int.fromString(substring(cond2_2, 14, (String.size(cond2_2) - 14))))
23 val randomOK = random1 <> random2 andalso random1 <> random3 andalso random1<> random4
24 andalso random2 <> random3 andalso random2 <> random4 andalso random3 <> random4
25 val condOK = condOK11 andalso condOK21 andalso condOK12 andalso condOK22 andalso randomOK
26 val cert1 = #cert(userRec1)
27 val cert2 = #cert(userRec2)
28 val veCipherMarks = SearchNodes(
29 EntireGraph, fn n => length (Mark.PE’PII_VE_CIPHER 1 n) > 0,
30 NoLimit, fn n => n, [], op :: );
31 val veCipher1 = List.nth (Mark.PE’PII_VE_CIPHER 1 8, 0)
32 val veCipher2 = List.nth (Mark.PE’PII_VE_CIPHER 1 46, 0)
33 val messageOK = cert1 = cert2 andalso #message(veCipher1) = #pii(cert1)
34 andalso #message(veCipher2) = #pii(cert2)
35 val keyOK = #key(veCipher1) = #pub(#veKeys(userRec1)) andalso
36 #key(veCipher2) = #pub(#veKeys(userRec2))
37 val labelOK = #label(veCipher1) = #genCond(#conditions(userRec1)) andalso
38 #label(veCipher2) = #genCond(#conditions(userRec2))
39 val veCipherOK = messageOK andalso keyOK andalso labelOK
40 val uchveEncMarks1 = SearchNodes(
41 EntireGraph, fn n => length (Mark.KE’TPM_GENERATED_CIPHER_UCHVE_KVE 1 n) > 0,
42 NoLimit, fn n => n, [], op :: );
43 val uchve11 = List.nth (Mark.KE’TPM_GENERATED_CIPHER_UCHVE_KVE 1 17, 0)
44 val uchve12 = List.nth (Mark.KE’TPM_GENERATED_CIPHER_UCHVE_KVE 1 55, 0)
45 val messageUchveOk1 = #message(uchve11) = #priv(#veKeys(userRec1)) andalso
46 #message(uchve12) = #priv(#veKeys(userRec2))
47 val labelUchveOk1 = #label(uchve11) = cond1_1 andalso #label(uchve12) = cond1_2
48 val uchveEncMarks2 = SearchNodes(
49 EntireGraph, fn n => length (Mark.MC’TPM_GENERATED_CIPHER_UCHVE_KVE 1 n) > 0,
50 NoLimit, fn n => n, [], op :: );
51 val uchve21 = List.nth (Mark.MC’TPM_GENERATED_CIPHER_UCHVE_KVE 1 32, 0)
52 val uchve22 = List.nth (Mark.MC’TPM_GENERATED_CIPHER_UCHVE_KVE 1 70, 0)
53 val messageUchveOk2 = #message(uchve21) = #priv(#veKeys(userRec1)) andalso
54 #message(uchve22) = #priv(#veKeys(userRec2))
55 val labelUchveOk2 = #label(uchve21) = cond2_1 andalso #label(uchve22) = cond2_2
56 val uchveOK = messageUchveOk1 andalso labelUchveOk1 andalso messageUchveOk2
57 andalso labelUchveOk2
58 val property1 = keyOK andalso condOK andalso veCipherOK andalso uchveOK;
59 if property1 then TextIO.output (os, "Property 1 is SATISFIED\n") else
60 TextIO.output (os, "Property 1 is NOT SATISFIED\n");
61 TextIO.closeOut os;
Table 11: Session-data and state-space analysis for Property-1
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1 val os = TextIO.openOut("property2.txt")
2 val userRec1 = readUserRecord("user_sess1.txt")
3 val userRec2 = readUserRecord("user_sess2.txt")
4 val idpRec1= readIDPRecord("idp_sess1.txt")
5 val idpRec2= readIDPRecord("idp_sess2.txt")
6 val sp1Rec1 = readSPRecord("sp1_sess1.txt")
7 val sp1Rec2 = readSPRecord("sp1_sess2.txt")
8 val sp2Rec1 = readSPRecord("sp2_sess1.txt")
9 val sp2Rec2 = readSPRecord("sp2_sess2.txt")
10 val cond1_1 = #conditions1(#conditions(userRec1))
11 val cond2_1 = #conditions2(#conditions(userRec1))
12 val cond1_2 = #conditions1(#conditions(userRec2))
13 val cond2_2 = #conditions2(#conditions(userRec2))
14
15 val veCipherMarks = SearchNodes(
16 EntireGraph, fn n => length (Mark.PE’PII_VE_CIPHER 1 n) > 0,
17 NoLimit, fn n => n, [], op :: );
18 val veCipher1 = List.nth (Mark.PE’PII_VE_CIPHER 1 8, 0)
19 val veCipher2 = List.nth (Mark.PE’PII_VE_CIPHER 1 46, 0)
20 val idpVeCipher1 = #cipherVE(idpRec1)
21 val idpVeCipher2 = #cipherVE(idpRec2)
22 val idpVECipherOK = idpVeCipher1 = veCipher1 andalso idpVeCipher2 = veCipher2 andalso
23 idpVeCipher1 = #cipherVE(sp1Rec1) andalso
24 idpVeCipher2 = #cipherVE(sp1Rec2) andalso
25 idpVeCipher1 = #cipherVE(sp2Rec1) andalso
26 idpVeCipher2 = #cipherVE(sp2Rec2);
27 val idpVePub1 = #vePubKey(idpRec1)
28 val idpVePub2 = #vePubKey(idpRec2)
29 val idpVePubOK = idpVePub1 = #pub(#veKeys(userRec1)) andalso
30 idpVePub2 = #pub(#veKeys(userRec2)) ;
31 val idpCondOK = #conditions1(#idpConditions(idpRec1)) = cond1_1 andalso
32 #conditions1(#idpConditions(idpRec2)) = cond1_2 andalso
33 #conditions(sp1Rec1) = cond1_1 andalso #conditions(sp1Rec2) = cond1_2
34 val PKVESuccessBE = PredAllArcs(
35 fn a => case ArcToBE a of
36 Bind.PE’IDP_GENERATES_STORES_PSEUDONYM_AND_SEND_TO_USER (1, {...} ) => true
37 | _ => false);
38 val PKVESuccess = length PKVESuccessBE = session
39 val idpPseudo1 = #pseudo(idpRec1)
40 val idpPseudo2 = #pseudo(idpRec2)
41 val pseudo1 = #pseudo(userRec1)
42 val pseudo2 = #pseudo(userRec2);
43 val idpGenerateCorrectPseudoOK1 =
44 valOf(Int.fromString(substring(idpPseudo1, 6, (String.size(idpPseudo1) - 6)))) >0 andalso
45 substring(idpPseudo1, 0, 6) = "pseudo";
46 val idpGenerateCorrectPseudoOK2 =
47 valOf(Int.fromString(substring(idpPseudo1, 6, (String.size(idpPseudo2) - 6)))) >0 andalso
48 substring(idpPseudo2, 0, 6) = "pseudo";
49 val pseudoOK = idpGenerateCorrectPseudoOK1 andalso idpGenerateCorrectPseudoOK2 andalso
50 idpPseudo1 = pseudo1 andalso idpPseudo2 = pseudo2
51 val property2 = idpVECipherOK andalso idpVePubOK andalso idpCondOK
52 andalso PKVESuccess andalso pseudoOK;
53 if property2 then TextIO.output (os, "Property 2 is SATISFIED") else
54 TextIO.output (os, "Property 2 is NOT SATISFIED");
55 TextIO.closeOut os;
Table 12: Session-data and state-space analysis for Property-2
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– state3-3: the IDP, and SP1 must receive the correct UCHVE encryption of
the VE private key as generated by Module2
– state3-4:the verification of the TPM proof of correct Module2 execution
must not fail (again, we do not consider any malicious behaviour from the
user yet at this point).
The queries used to verify this property are shown in Table 13.
5.4 Property-4
Property-4 establishes a correct MC stage. Assuming that Property1 holds, at
the end of a MC stage, the protocol should be at the following states:
– state4-1: the IDP must have an open authenticated session with the user
– state4-2: the IDP, and SP2 must receive the correct UCHVE encryption of
the VE private key as generated by Module2
– state4-3: the verification of the TPM proof of correct Module2 execution
must not fail (no malicious behaviour)
The queries used to verify this property are shown in Table 14.
5.5 Property-5
Property5 establishes a correct multiple-session ending property. At the end of
executing multiple PIEMC sessions (in our model, we parameterize the model to
execute two sessions as indicated by the session parameter in line 56 of Table
2), the protocol should be at the following state:
– state1: given an interaction between a user and SP1 (in session 1 and session
2), the values of the condition string that SP1 has should be the same as the
ones that the user, IdP, SP1 have within the same session,
– state2: given an interaction between a user and SP2 (in session 1 and session
2), the values of the condition string that SP2 has should be the same as the
ones that the user, IdP, SP2 have within the same session,
– state3: regardless of the session number, the condition string value between
SP1 and SP2 should always be different,
– the user-generated one-time VE key pair (K PUB VE and K PRIV VE)
must be different from session 1 to session 2
– state4: the one-time public VE key (K PUB VE) that the IDP receives
must be consistent with the one that the user has in both sessions.
– state5: the one-time public VE key (K PUB VE) value that the IDP re-
ceives must be different from one session to another (to represent uniqueness
and the one-time property of the keys)
– state6: the value of the CIPHER VE PII, and the CIPHER UCHVE KVE
must be different from one session to another
– state7: the pseudonym that the IdP generates for the user must be different
from one session to another
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1 val os = TextIO.openOut("property3.txt")
2 val userRec1 = readUserRecord("user_sess1.txt")
3 val userRec2 = readUserRecord("user_sess2.txt")
4 val sp1Rec1 = readSPRecord("sp1_sess1.txt")
5 val sp1Rec2 = readSPRecord("sp1_sess2.txt")
6 val idpRec1 = readIDPRecord("idp_sess1.txt")
7 val idpRec2 = readIDPRecord("idp_Sess2.txt")
8
9 val cond1_1 = #conditions1(#conditions(userRec1))
10 val cond1_2 = #conditions1(#conditions(userRec2))
11 val condOK = cond1_1= #conditions(sp1Rec1) andalso cond1_2 = #conditions(sp1Rec2) andalso
12 #conditions1(#idpConditions(idpRec1)) = cond1_1 andalso
13 #conditions1(#idpConditions(idpRec2)) = cond1_2
14 val aikPub1 = #pubAIK(#tpmKeys(userRec1))
15 val aikPub2 = #pubAIK(#tpmKeys(userRec2))
16 val aikOK = aikPub1 = #aikVerifyKey(#verifyKeys(idpRec1)) andalso
17 aikPub2 = #aikVerifyKey(#verifyKeys(idpRec2))
18
19 val sessionSignKey1 = #sessionSignKey(userRec1)
20 val sessionSignKey2 = #sessionSignKey(userRec2)
21 val sessionKeyOK = sessionSignKey1 = #sessionVerifyKey(#verifyKeys(idpRec1)) andalso
22 sessionSignKey2 = #sessionVerifyKey(#verifyKeys(idpRec2))
23
24 val ibepreEncMarks = SearchNodes(
25 EntireGraph,
26 fn n => length (Mark.KE’TPM_GENERATED_CIPHER_UCHVE_KVE 1 n) > 0,
27 NoLimit,
28 fn n => n,
29 [],
30 op :: );
31 val uchve1 = List.nth (Mark.KE’TPM_GENERATED_CIPHER_UCHVE_KVE 1 17, 0)
32 val uchve2 = List.nth (Mark.KE’TPM_GENERATED_CIPHER_UCHVE_KVE 1 55, 0)
33 val uchveOK = uchve1 = #cipherUCHVE(sp1Rec1) andalso uchve2 = #cipherUCHVE(sp1Rec2) andalso
34 uchve1 = #cipherUCHVE1(idpRec1) andalso uchve2 = #cipherUCHVE1(idpRec2);
35
36 val DAABE = PredAllArcs(
37 fn a => case ArcToBE a of
38 Bind.KE’IDP_VERIFIES_STORES_AIK_PUB_KEY_SESSION_KEY (1, {result=x, ...} ) => x=true
39 | _ => false);
40 val DAASuccess = length DAABE = session
41
42
43 val tpmVerifyMarks = SearchNodes(
44 EntireGraph,
45 fn n => length (Mark.KE’TPM_PROOF_VERIFICATION_RESULT 1 n) > 0,
46 NoLimit,
47 fn n => n,
48 [],
49 op :: );
50 val tpmResult1 = List.nth (Mark.KE’TPM_PROOF_VERIFICATION_RESULT 1 20, 0)
51 val tpmResult2 = List.nth (Mark.KE’TPM_PROOF_VERIFICATION_RESULT 1 58, 0)
52 val tpmModule1OK = tpmResult1 andalso tpmResult2 andalso length tpmVerifyMarks = session
53
54 val property3 = condOK andalso sessionKeyOK andalso uchveOK andalso DAASuccess
55 andalso tpmModule1OK;
56 if property3 then
57 TextIO.output (os, "Property 3 is SATISFIED") else
58 TextIO.output (os, "Property3 is NOT SATISFIED");
59
60 TextIO.closeOut os;
Table 13: Session-data and state-space analysis for Property-3
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1 val os = TextIO.openOut("property4.txt")
2 fun verifyRenc(renc1:CIPHER_UCHVE_KVE, enc:CIPHER_UCHVE_KVE, cond:LABEL) =
3 #message(renc1) = #message(enc) andalso
4 #label(renc1) = cond;
5 val userRec1 = readUserRecord("user_sess1.txt")
6 val userRec2 = readUserRecord("user_sess2.txt")
7 val sp2Rec1 = readSPRecord("sp2_sess1.txt")
8 val sp2Rec2 = readSPRecord("sp2_sess2.txt")
9 val idpRec1 = readIDPRecord("idp_sess1.txt")
10 val idpRec2 = readIDPRecord("idp_Sess2.txt")
11
12 val cond2_1 = #conditions2(#conditions(userRec1))
13 val cond2_2 = #conditions2(#conditions(userRec2))
14 val condOK = cond2_1= #conditions(sp2Rec1) andalso cond2_2 = #conditions(sp2Rec2) andalso
15 #conditions2(#idpConditions(idpRec1)) = cond2_1 andalso
16 #conditions2(#idpConditions(idpRec2)) = cond2_2
17
18
19 val openAuthMarks = SearchNodes(
20 EntireGraph,
21 fn n => length (Mark.MC’OPEN_AUTHENTICATED_SESSION_EXISTS 1 n) > 0,
22 NoLimit,
23 fn n => n,
24 [],
25 op :: );
26 val openAuthResult1 = List.nth (Mark.MC’OPEN_AUTHENTICATED_SESSION_EXISTS 1 30, 0)
27 val openAuthResult2 = List.nth (Mark.MC’OPEN_AUTHENTICATED_SESSION_EXISTS 1 68, 0)
28 val openAuthOK = openAuthResult1 andalso openAuthResult2
29 andalso length openAuthMarks = session
30
31 val idpRenc1 = #cipherUCHVE2(idpRec1)
32 val idpRenc2 = #cipherUCHVE2(idpRec2)
33 val idpUchve1 = #cipherUCHVE1(idpRec1)
34 val idpUchve2 = #cipherUCHVE1(idpRec2)
35 val idpRencOK = verifyRenc(idpRenc1, idpUchve1, cond2_1)
36 andalso verifyRenc(idpRenc2, idpUchve2, cond2_2)
37
38 val rencOK = idpRenc1 = #cipherUCHVE(sp2Rec1) andalso idpRenc2 = #cipherUCHVE(sp2Rec2)
39
40 val property4 = condOK andalso openAuthOK andalso idpRencOK andalso rencOK;
41
42 if property4 then TextIO.output (os, "Property 4 is SATISFIED")
43 else TextIO.output (os, "Property 4 is NOT SATISFIED");
44 TextIO.closeOut os;
Table 14: Session-data and state-space analysis for Property-4
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To verify this property, we use the session-data analysis approach as shown in
Table 15. As explained in Section 4.2, at the end of each session, we archive the
particular session data into a file for each entity. These files act like a ‘database’
that can be use for analysis. Line 1-10 in Table 15 show the process of reading
the user, IdP, SP1, and SP2 session data files into a set of variables, each with
their respective CPN colour type.
Line 12-36 are the core session-data analysis. Line 12-15 and line 17-20 verify
if state1 and state2 are achieved respectively. Line 22-23 verify the achieve-
ment of state3. Line 25-26 verify if state4 and state5 are satisfied, while line
28-34 verify the fulfillment of state6. Line 36 verifies the satisfaction of state7.
Finally, in order to verify if Property5 has been satisfied, we need to make sure
that all state1 - state6 are satisfied. This is verified at line 38-39. Figure 10
shows the result of executing the Table 15 query confirming the satisfaction of
Property5.
Fig. 10: Result of executing Property5 Query
Property-6 Property-6 establishes the correct modeling of the revocation stage.
Assuming that SP1 genuinely claims the fulfillment of the conditions, at the end
of the revocation stage, a PII must be revealed.
The queries used to verify this property are shown in Table 16.
6 Verification of the PIEMC Protocol
In Section 4.2, we have described the model of PIEMC. In this section, we
detail our approach to verifying security properties of the PIEMC protocol. Due
to many similarities in verifying the security properties for both the PIEMC
protocol with and without trusted ARM, in this paper, we pick the security
properties for the PIEMC protocol without the trusted ARM. The main reason
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1 val os = TextIO.openOut("property5.txt");
2
3 val userRec1 = readUserRecord("user_sess1.txt");
4 val userRec2 = readUserRecord("user_sess2.txt");
5 val sp2Rec1 = readSPRecord("sp2_sess1.txt");
6 val sp2Rec2 = readSPRecord("sp2_sess2.txt");
7 val sp1Rec1 = readSPRecord("sp1_sess1.txt");
8 val sp1Rec2 = readSPRecord("sp1_sess2.txt");
9 val idpRec1 = readIDPRecord("idp_sess1.txt");
10 val idpRec2 = readIDPRecord("idp_sess2.txt");
11
12 val sameCond1 = #conditions1(#conditions(userRec1)) = #conditions1(#idpConditions(idpRec1))
13 andalso #conditions1(#conditions(userRec1))= #conditions(sp1Rec1) andalso
14 #conditions1(#conditions(userRec2)) = #conditions1(#idpConditions(idpRec2))
15 andalso #conditions1(#conditions(userRec2)) = #conditions(sp1Rec2);
16
17 val sameCond2 = #conditions2(#conditions(userRec1)) = #conditions2(#idpConditions(idpRec1))
18 andalso #conditions2(#conditions(userRec1))= #conditions(sp2Rec1) andalso
19 #conditions2(#conditions(userRec2)) = #conditions2(#idpConditions(idpRec2))
20 andalso #conditions2(#conditions(userRec2)) = #conditions(sp2Rec2);
21
22 val diffCond = #conditions1(#conditions(userRec1)) <> #conditions2(#conditions(userRec1));
23 val condConsistent = sameCond1 andalso sameCond2 andalso diffCond;
24
25 val oneTimeVEKeys = #veKeys(userRec1) <> #veKeys(userRec2);
26 val oneTimeVEPub = #vePubKey(idpRec1) <> #vePubKey(idpRec2);
27
28 val oneTimeVeCipher = #cipherVE(sp1Rec1) <> #cipherVE(sp1Rec2) andalso
29 #cipherVE(sp2Rec1) <> #cipherVE(sp2Rec2)
30
31 val oneTimeUchve = #cipherUCHVE(sp1Rec1) <> #cipherUCHVE(sp1Rec2) andalso
32 #cipherUCHVE(sp2Rec1) <> #cipherUCHVE(sp2Rec2) andalso
33 #cipherUCHVE(sp1Rec1) <> #cipherUCHVE(sp2Rec1) andalso
34 #cipherUCHVE(sp1Rec2) <> #cipherUCHVE(sp2Rec2)
35
36 val oneTimePseudo = #pseudo(userRec1) <> #pseudo(userRec2)
37
38 val property5 = condConsistent andalso oneTimeVEKeys andalso oneTimeVEPub andalso
39 oneTimeVeCipher andalso oneTimeUchve andalso oneTimePseudo;
40
41 if property5 then TextIO.output(os, "Property 5 is SATISFIED") else
42 TextIO.output(os, "Property 5 is NOT SATISFIED");
43
44 TextIO.closeOut os;
Table 15: Session-data Analysis for Property5
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1 val os = TextIO.openOut("property6.txt");
2 val userRec1 = readUserRecord("user_sess1.txt")
3 val userRec2 = readUserRecord("user_sess2.txt")
4
5 val revealedMark = SearchNodes(
6 EntireGraph,
7 fn n => length (Mark.REVOCATION’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 n) > 0,
8 NoLimit,
9 fn n => n,
10 [],
11 op :: );
12
13 val revealedPII1 = List.nth(Mark.REVOCATION’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 234, 0)
14 val revealedPII2 = List.nth(Mark.REVOCATION’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 234, 0)
15 val revealedPII3 = List.nth(Mark.REVOCATION’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 233, 0)
16 val revealedPII4 = List.nth(Mark.REVOCATION’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 231, 0)
17 val revealedPII5 = List.nth(Mark.REVOCATION’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 230, 0)
18 val revealedPII6 = List.nth(Mark.REVOCATION’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 229, 0)
19 val revealedPII7 = List.nth(Mark.REVOCATION’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 227, 0)
20 val revealedPII8 = List.nth(Mark.REVOCATION’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 223, 0)
21 val revealedPII9 = List.nth(Mark.REVOCATION’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 222, 0)
22 val revealedPII10 = List.nth(Mark.REVOCATION’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 214, 0)
23 val revealedPII11 = List.nth(Mark.REVOCATION’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 212, 0)
24 val revealedPII12 = List.nth(Mark.REVOCATION’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 202, 0)
25 val property6 = #cert(userRec1) = #cert(userRec2) andalso
26 revealedPII1 = #pii(#cert(userRec1)) andalso
27 revealedPII2 = #pii(#cert(userRec1)) andalso
28 revealedPII3 = #pii(#cert(userRec1)) andalso
29 revealedPII4 = #pii(#cert(userRec1)) andalso
30 revealedPII5 = #pii(#cert(userRec1)) andalso
31 revealedPII6 = #pii(#cert(userRec1)) andalso
32 revealedPII7 = #pii(#cert(userRec1)) andalso
33 revealedPII8 = #pii(#cert(userRec1)) andalso
34 revealedPII9 = #pii(#cert(userRec1)) andalso
35 revealedPII10 = #pii(#cert(userRec1)) andalso
36 revealedPII11 = #pii(#cert(userRec1)) andalso
37 revealedPII12 = #pii(#cert(userRec1));
38
39
40 if property6 then TextIO.output (os, "Property 6 is SATISFIED") else
41 TextIO.output (os, "Property 6 is NOT SATISFIED");
42
43 TextIO.closeOut os;
Table 16: Session-data and state-space analysis for Property-6
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is because the model description explained in Section 4 is mostly based on the
one without trusted ARM. We have performed the security property verification
for both variants of the protocol and we notice that the approach used is very
similar.
In general, we use two main approaches in verifying security properties: ses-
sion data analysis and state-space analysis.
Session-data Analysis As described in Section 4.2, at the end of each session,
we create a new file which stores a session’s data. This data can then be used
for the purpose of verifying if some security properties are achieved by using the
existing SML and CPN ML functions. In addition, session data is very useful to
verify the protocol correctness.
State-space Analysis State-space analysis is a very powerful tool to verify security
properties of the PIEMC protocol. Our approach in using state-space analysis
is normally to combine it with session-data analysis in a multi-step property
verification approach: since security properties can be complex, it is necessary
to ‘prove’ their satisfaction by translating them into a series of statements that
can be verified through a series of state-space and session-data queries.
The verification of PIEMCP are carried out in two stages: the basic behaviour
verification and security behaviour verification. The basic behaviour verification
is performed through standard state space analysis. It includes analysis of proper
session termination, deadlock freedom, livelock freedom, and absence of unex-
pected dead transitions. The security behaviour verification is the focus of the
paper, and is performed through advanced state space analysis and session data
analysis. Furthermore, verifying the security behaviour of PIEMCP is compli-
cated due to the numerous avenues in which attackers could break the security
protection provided by the protocol. Due to the complexity of the protocol, the
potential numerous undetected weak points may lead the protocol to insecure
states.
We propose to scope the verification of the security behaviour of PIEMCP
within a set of plausible known attack scenarios. The result of such a verification
is the assurance that the desired security behaviour are achieved within a set of
known attack scenarios. As attacks are parameterised in the model, new types
of attack scenarios can be added to the existing model without requiring major
changes or new model to be developed.
We define a protocol to be secure if the set of security properties hold in
both the presence of attack models and the absence of attack models. This is
especially true in the case of PESPs whose main service (privacy) is in itself
already a security behaviour. When no attacks are modeled, we expect the secu-
rity behaviours to be fulfilled; when attacks are included, we expect the protocol
to either detect it (and therefore stops), or be immune from those attacks. In
this section, we explain our approach through the verification of PIEMCP-NT.
For simplicity, we consider a minimum full protocol execution. The PIEMCP
CPN model is parameterised to execute two escrow sessions sequentially, fol-
lowed by one revocation session. Note that it is possible for both the escrow
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and revocation session to run in parallel, however, modeling such a concurrency
does not capture any additional behaviours of the protocol as these two sessions
are distinct, i.e. they do not interfere with each other. The state space gener-
ated from the above in the absence of attack behaviour contains 147 nodes and
226 arcs. Next, the CPN model is parameterised to include a number of plausi-
ble known attacks, resulting a set of parameterised CPN models. Each of these
models is executed to generate the state space for analysis of certain security
properties. Below, we define five security properties and discuss how they are
verified using session data analysis and state space analysis.
Approach Generally, we use the following approach to verifying security proper-
ties:
1. translate the security properties into a series of statements that can be ver-
ified using either the session-data analysis or state-space analysis,
2. write the necessary queries to verify the statements under the assumption
that all entities behave honestly (that is, no attack behaviours are included).
3. If the queries confirm the satisfaction of a security property, proceeds to
verify the property with attack behaviours. Else, stop.
4. Decide on a set of suitable attacks that may compromise the satisfaction of
the security property.
5. If necessary, modify the statements that are suitable to verify the security
property in the presence of the attacks
6. Write queries to verify the security property in the presence of the modeled
attack(s).
As we explained in the introduction (Section 1), exhaustive identification of
all possible attacks and the corresponding exhaustive verification of the pro-
tocol behaviour in response to those attacks is impossible. Consequently, it is
important that our approach to verifying a protocol’s security property needs
to be expandable. Our approach proposed above is expandable, that is, step 4-6
can be repeatedly performed to cover as many additional attack behaviours as
necessary. With a parameterization approach to modeling attack behaviour, it
is possible that we do not have to ‘break’ the existing model; rather, new attack
behaviour can simply be added to the model such that the existing model for the
protocol, attack behaviours, and their corresponding state-space or session-data
queries are retained and still usable.
To illustrate our approach to verifying these security properties, we explain
in detail our approach to verifying security properties as deatailed in Section
3.3.
Property 1 (Multiple Conditions). At the end of every escrow session, the PII
escrowed must be bound to multiple sets of alternative conditions, each to be
used with a different SP.
To verify this property, we need to verify that the UCHVE ciphertexts produced
at the KE and MC stages encrypt the same message (the VE public key) but
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under different conditions. Therefore, in the absence of attacks, this property
can be verified by doing a simple session-data analysis.
The queries that we can use to verify the above property are shown in Table
17.
1 val sp1Rec1 = readSPRecord("sp1_sess1.txt")
2 val sp1Rec2 = readSPRecord("sp1_sess2.txt")
3 val sp2Rec1 = readSPRecord("sp2_sess1.txt")
4 val sp2Rec2 = readSPRecord("sp2_sess2.txt")
5 val cipherUCHVE11 = #cipherUCHVE(sp1Rec1)
6 val cipherUCHVE21 = #cipherUCHVE(sp2Rec1)
7 val cipherUCHVE12 = #cipherUCHVE(sp1Rec2)
8 val cipherUCHVE22 = #cipherUCHVE(sp2Rec2)
9
10 val messageSame = #message(cipherUCHVE11) = #message(cipherUCHVE21) andalso
11 #message(cipherUCHVE12) = #message(cipherUCHVE22);
12 val differentCond = #label(cipherUCHVE11) <> #label(cipherUCHVE21) andalso
13 #label(cipherUCHVE12) <> #label(cipherUCHVE22);
14
15 val multipleConditions = messageSame andalso differentCond;
Table 17: State-space and session data analysis for the Multiple Conditions property -
normal
However, when SP1 and SP2 collude and attempt to fool the user to accept
the same condition string (captured in the attack parameter SP ATTACK7), this
property may be violated. Our initial verification shows that this property does
not hold when this attack parameter is switched on. We found that this is due
to a missing operation in the original protocol design which requires the user to
verify the one-time property of the condition string before being used. A sim-
ple function to capture such a one-time condition string property verification is
therefore defined and added to the protocol design. With this function included,
such an attack is detected and the protocol stops (verified by checking the pro-
tocol dead marking). Therefore, this property holds in the updated protocol
definition.
Property 2 (Zero-knowledge). Prior to conditions fulfillment, IdPs, SPs, and
referees must not learn the value of the user’s PII but at the same time be con-
vinced that its encryption is correct; when conditions are fulfilled, the revealed
PII must indeed be a correct certified PII
Without considering attacks, the first verification part can simply be performed
by examining session-data analysis to make sure that the IdP, SP1, and SP2 only
possess the ciphertext forms of the VE private key and PII - not their plain-text
form. Recall that a message field in a record representing a ciphertext is treated
as un-readable. The second verification part (after conditions fulfillment) can be
performed using a simple state-space analysis. Our verification process confirms
that this property is satisfied when no attack is included. The session data and
state-space analysis used is shown in Table 18.
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1 val os = TextIO.openOut (zero-knowledge.txt");
2 TextIO.output (os, "Verifying the Zero-knowledge property.\n");
3 val userRec1 = readUserRecord("user_sess1.txt");
4 val userRec2 = readUserRecord("user_sess2.txt");
5 val sp2Rec1 = readSPRecord("sp2_sess1.txt");
6 val sp2Rec2 = readSPRecord("sp2_sess2.txt");
7 val sp1Rec1 = readSPRecord("sp1_sess1.txt");
8 val sp1Rec2 = readSPRecord("sp1_sess2.txt");
9 val startRevokeMarkList = SearchNodes(
10 EntireGraph,
11 fn n => length (Mark.REVOCATION’REVOCATION_CONDITIONS_FULFILLED 1 n) > 0,
12 NoLimit, fn n => n, [], op :: );
13 val startRevokeMark = List.nth (startRevokeMarkList, 0)
14 val revealedMarks = SearchNodes(
15 EntireGraph,
16 fn n => length (Mark.PIEMC’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 n) > 0 orelse
17 length (Mark.REVOCATION’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 n) > 0 orelse
18 length (Mark.REVOCATION’VE_PRIVATE_KEY 1 n) > 0 orelse
19 length (Mark.REVOCATION’REF_RECOVERED_VE_PRIVATE_KEY 1 n) > 0,
20 NoLimit, fn n => n, [], op :: );
21 val wrongMarks = SearchNodes(
22 revealedMarks,
23 fn n => not (Reachable (startRevokeMark, n)),
24 NoLimit, fn n =>n, [], op :: );
25 val noLearn = length wrongMarks = 0
26 val correctPII = #pii(#cert(userRec1)) = #message(#cipherVE(sp1Rec1)) andalso
27 #pii(#cert(userRec1)) = #message(#cipherVE(sp2Rec1)) andalso
28 #pii(#cert(userRec2)) = #message(#cipherVE(sp1Rec2)) andalso
29 #pii(#cert(userRec2)) = #message(#cipherVE(sp2Rec2)) ;
30
31 val correctUCHVE = #priv(#veKeys(userRec1)) = #message(#cipherUCHVE(sp1Rec1)) andalso
32 #priv(#veKeys(userRec1)) = #message(#cipherUCHVE(sp2Rec1)) andalso
33 #priv(#veKeys(userRec2)) = #message(#cipherUCHVE(sp1Rec2)) andalso
34 #priv(#veKeys(userRec2)) = #message(#cipherUCHVE(sp2Rec2));
35
36 if correctPII andalso correctUCHVE then
37 TextIO.output (os, "At the end of each session, SPs have correct ciphertexts.\n\n") else
38 TextIO.output (os, "At the end of each session, SPs does not have correct ciphertexts.\n\n");
39
40 TextIO.output (os, "Find marking where user PII is revoked, and compare the revoked value.\n");
41 val revealedNode = SearchNodes(
42 EntireGraph,
43 fn n => length (Mark.REVOCATION’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 n) > 0,
44 NoLimit, fn n => n, [], op :: );
45 val mark1 = List.nth(revealedNode, 0);
46 val mark2 = List.nth(revealedNode, 1);
47 val mark3 = List.nth(revealedNode, 2);
48 val mark4 = List.nth(revealedNode, 3);
49 val correctRevealed = if length revealedNode>0 andalso
50 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 mark1, 0) = #pii(#cert(userRec1)) andalso
51 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 mark2, 0) = #pii(#cert(userRec1)) andalso
52 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 mark3, 0) = #pii(#cert(userRec1)) andalso
53 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 mark4, 0) = #pii(#cert(userRec1))
54 then true else false;
55
56 val failProofList = SearchNodes(
57 EntireGraph,
58 fn n => length (Mark.PE’PII_VE_CIPHER_RESULT 1 n) > 0 andalso
59 not (List.nth (Mark.PE’PII_VE_CIPHER_RESULT 1 n, 0)),
60 NoLimit, fn n => n, [], op :: );
61 val proofSuccess = length failProofList=0;
62 if noLearn andalso correctPII andalso correctUCHVE andalso correctRevealed
63 andalso proofSuccess then
64 TextIO.output (os, "The Authenticated PII property is SATISFIED.\n") else
65 TextIO.output (os, "The Authenticated PII property is NOT SATISFIED.\n");
66 TextIO.closeOut os;
Table 18: State-space and session data analysis for the zero-knowledge property
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Next, we determine the attack scenarios that may violate this security be-
haviour. One plausible attack is when the SP1 or SP2 colludes with the referees.
Together, they may be able to decrypt the UCHVE ciphertext to reveal the
VE private key and subsequently reveal the PII. This attack is captured by the
REF ATTACK2 parameter. In particular, we need to verify that
– prior to conditions fulfillment, the IdP, SP, and referees do not learn the
value of the user’s PII. This can be verified by checking if the places which
indicate the K PRIV VE or PII value in cleartext have empty token prior
to the revocation stage. These places include:
• PIEMC’RECOVERED USER PII
• REVOCATION’RECOVERED USER PII
• REVOCATION’VE PRIVATE KEY, and
• REVOCATION’REF RECOVERED VE PRIVATE KEY
– the VE ciphertext that SP1 and SP2 receive must correctly encrypt user
certified PII,
– the UCHVE ciphertexts that SP1 and SP2 receive must correctly encrypt
the corresponding VE private key that the user generated per session,
– all of the above ciphertexts are encrypted under the correct labels (this has
been verified from Property 2, Property 3, and Property 4),
– the place PE’PII VE CIPHER RESULT, KE’TPM PROOF VERIFICATION RESULT,
and MC’TPM PROOF VERIFICATION RESULTmust never contain a value
of ‘false’ - this is to indicate that all zero-knowledge protocol and TPM proofs
are accepted by the IdP as a convincing evidence of correct encryptions.
– After conditions fulfillment (that is, when a revocation of the PII is suc-
cessful), the revoked PII must be the same as the one stored in the user
certificate.
Having switched on this attack, we executed the same queries (with minor
modification) to confirm that this property holds in the presence of REF ATTACK2
given that there are only t−1 out of t dishonest designated referees. When there
are t dishonest referees, this property is violated. The queries used is detailed in
Table 19
Property 3 (Enforceable Conditions). A user’s PII should never be revealed
before all designated referees agree that the cryptographically bounded condi-
tions are satisfied.
We translate this security property into the following statements:
– When the associated conditions are satisfied (that is, the condActually
parameter is set to ‘true’), there must be
• a marking where the place PI.REVOCATION’REF1 COND FULFILLMENT
and PI.REVOCATION’REF2 COND FULFILLMENT (the designated
referees) are populated with a token of value ‘true’ simultaneously. We
call this marking M1 - this marking implies that all designated referees
have agreed that the revocation conditions are satisfied. The decision of
non-designated referee is irrelevant),
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1 val os = TextIO.openOut ("zk_attack.txt");
2 TextIO.output (os, "Verifying the Zero-knowledge property.\n");
3 val userRec1 = readUserRecord("user_sess1.txt");
4 val userRec2 = readUserRecord("user_sess2.txt");
5 val sp2Rec1 = readSPRecord("sp2_sess1.txt");
6 val sp2Rec2 = readSPRecord("sp2_sess2.txt");
7 val sp1Rec1 = readSPRecord("sp1_sess1.txt");
8 val sp1Rec2 = readSPRecord("sp1_sess2.txt");
9 val startRevokeMarkList = SearchNodes(
10 EntireGraph, fn n => length (Mark.REVOCATION’REVOCATION_CONDITIONS_FULFILLED 1 n) > 0,
11 NoLimit, fn n => n, [], op :: );
12 val startRevokeMark = List.nth (startRevokeMarkList, 0)
13 val revealedMarks = SearchNodes(
14 EntireGraph,
15 fn n => length (Mark.PIEMC’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 n) > 0 orelse
16 length (Mark.REVOCATION’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 n) > 0 orelse
17 length (Mark.REVOCATION’VE_PRIVATE_KEY 1 n) > 0 orelse
18 length (Mark.REVOCATION’REF_RECOVERED_VE_PRIVATE_KEY 1 n) > 0,
19 NoLimit, fn n => n, [], op :: );
20 val wrongMarks = SearchNodes(
21 revealedMarks, fn n => not (Reachable (startRevokeMark, n)),
22 NoLimit, fn n =>n, [], op :: );
23 val noLearn = length wrongMarks = 0
24 val correctPII = #pii(#cert(userRec1)) = #message(#cipherVE(sp1Rec1)) andalso
25 #pii(#cert(userRec1)) = #message(#cipherVE(sp2Rec1)) andalso
26 #pii(#cert(userRec2)) = #message(#cipherVE(sp1Rec2)) andalso
27 #pii(#cert(userRec2)) = #message(#cipherVE(sp2Rec2)) ;
28
29 val correctUCHVE = #priv(#veKeys(userRec1)) = #message(#cipherUCHVE(sp1Rec1)) andalso
30 #priv(#veKeys(userRec1)) = #message(#cipherUCHVE(sp2Rec1)) andalso
31 #priv(#veKeys(userRec2)) = #message(#cipherUCHVE(sp1Rec2)) andalso
32 #priv(#veKeys(userRec2)) = #message(#cipherUCHVE(sp2Rec2));
33 if correctPII andalso correctUCHVE then
34 TextIO.output (os, "At the end of each session, SPs have correct ciphertexts.\n\n") else
35 TextIO.output (os, "At the end of each session, SPs does not
36 have correct ciphertexts.\n\n");
37 TextIO.output (os, "Find marking where user PII is revoked,
38 and compare the revoked value.\n");
39 val revealedNode = SearchNodes(
40 EntireGraph, fn n => length (Mark.REVOCATION’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 n) > 0,
41 NoLimit, fn n => n, [], op :: );
42 val mark1 = List.nth(revealedNode, 0);
43 val mark2 = List.nth(revealedNode, 1);
44 val mark3 = List.nth(revealedNode, 2);
45 val mark4 = List.nth(revealedNode, 3);
46 val correctRevealed = if length revealedNode>0 andalso
47 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 mark1, 0) = #pii(#cert(userRec1)) andalso
48 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 mark2, 0) = #pii(#cert(userRec1)) andalso
49 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 mark3, 0) = #pii(#cert(userRec1)) andalso
50 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 mark4, 0) = #pii(#cert(userRec1))
51 then true else false;
52 val failProofList = SearchNodes(
53 EntireGraph, fn n => length (Mark.PE’PII_VE_CIPHER_RESULT 1 n) > 0 andalso
54 not (List.nth (Mark.PE’PII_VE_CIPHER_RESULT 1 n, 0)),
55 NoLimit, fn n => n, [], op :: );
56 val proofSuccess = length failProofList=0;
57 val refLearn = SearchNodes(
58 EntireGraph, fn n => length (Mark.REVOCATION’REF_RECOVERED_VE_PRIVATE_KEY 1 n) > 0,
59 NoLimit, fn n=> n, [], op ::);
60 if noLearn andalso correctPII andalso correctUCHVE
61 andalso correctRevealed andalso proofSuccess andalso length refLearn=0 then
62 TextIO.output (os, "The zero-knowledge property is SATISFIED.\n") else
63 TextIO.output (os, "The zero-knowledge property is NOT SATISFIED.\n");
64 TextIO.closeOut os;
Table 19: State-space and session data analysis for the zero-knowledge property with
REF ATTACK2
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• another marking indicating that the user’s PII is revealed (indicated by
a token in the place PI.REVOCATION’RECEOVERED USER PII) -
we call this marking M2, and
• M2 must only exist if there is M1, and M1 must happen before M2.
– When the associated conditions are not satisfied (that is, the condActually
parameter is set to ‘false’), there must be
• a marking where the place PI.REVOCATION’REF1 COND FULFILLMENT
and PI.REVOCATION’REF2 COND FULFILLMENT (the designated
referees) are populated with a token of value ‘false’ simultaneously. We
call this marking M1’ - this marking implies that all designated referees
have decided that the revocation conditions are not satisfied.
• M2 should NOT exist.
The above statements are translated into a series of queries as shown in Table
20
When condActually=true, we have line 3-16 in Table 20 which verify if M1
exists, and if so, if it is valid. Similarly, line 17-24 verify the existence and validity
of M2. Line 25-33 verify if M1 happens before M2. The enforceable condition
property is fulfilled when all of the above verification succeed (line 34).
When condActually=false, then we have line 39-49 verifying the existence
and validity of M1’. Line 50-55 verify the non-existence of M2. Finally, the en-
forceable conditions property is satisfied when the above two verifications succeed
(line 56).
The results for both queries are shown in Figure 11. They confirm the fulfill-
ment of the enforceable conditions property.
Next, we need to decide on a set of relevant attacks that may compromise the
fulfillment of this property. We decide that these attacks include SP ATTACK3,
SP ATTACK4, REF ATTACK1, and REF ATTACK2. When these attacks are
included, we need to show that:
– if SP ATTACK3 is enabled, then we should expect the referees to still agree
of conditions fulfillment, but decryption of the UCHVE pieces should fail.
Therefore, revocation stage will stop prematurely: we should expect M1, but
there should be no M2, and we should expect empty token at the place
REVOCATION’UCHVE PIECE DECRYPT SUCCESS.
– if SP ATTACK4 is enabled, then it is logical to also enable REF ATTACK1
(to mimic collusion between SP/IDP and referees). In this case, we expect
two malicious referees to still be able to decrypt the UCHVE piece, however,
the one honest referee does not. Therefore, M1 and M2 should not exist as
well and the place REVOCATION’UCHVE PIECE DECRYPT SUCCESS
should only contain 1 token (as a result of decryption by malicious referee -
honest referee won’t decrypt, and non-designatedRef returns failed decryp-
tion token).
– in both scenario above, REF ATTACK2 can be enabled simultaneously to
simulate referees trying to recover K PRIV VE. In this case, we need to ver-
ify that the place PI.REF RECOVERED VE PRIVATE KEY should never
have any empty token (maximum bound is 0).
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1 State-space query when ’condActually=true’:
2
3 val m1Nodes = SearchNodes(
4 EntireGraph,
5 fn n => length (Mark.REVOCATION’REF1_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 n) > 0 andalso
6 length (Mark.REVOCATION’REF2_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 n) > 0,
7 NoLimit, fn n => n, [], op :: );
8 val m1Len = length m1Nodes;
9 val m11 = List.nth (m1Nodes, 0); val m12 = List.nth (m1Nodes, 1);
10 val m13 = List.nth (m1Nodes, 2); val m14 = List.nth (m1Nodes, 3);
11 val m1Correct = if length m1Nodes>0 andalso
12 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’REF1_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 m11 , 0) andalso
13 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’REF2_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 m12 , 0) andalso
14 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’REF2_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 m13 , 0) andalso
15 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’REF2_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 m14 , 0)
16 then true else false;
17 val m2Nodes = SearchNodes(
18 EntireGraph,
19 fn n => length (Mark.REVOCATION’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 n) > 0,
20 NoLimit, fn n => n, [], op :: );
21 val m2Len = length m2Nodes;
22 val m21 = List.nth (m2Nodes, 0); val m22 = List.nth (m2Nodes, 1);
23 val m23 = List.nth (m2Nodes, 2); val m24 = List.nth (m2Nodes, 3);
24 val m2Correct = m2Len > 0;
25 val ok1 = Reachable (m11, m21) orelse Reachable (m12, m21) orelse
26 Reachable (m13, m21) orelse Reachable (m14, m21);
27 val ok2 = Reachable (m11, m22) orelse Reachable (m12, m22) orelse
28 Reachable (m13, m22) orelse Reachable (m14, m22);
29 val ok3 = Reachable (m11, m23) orelse Reachable (m12, m23) orelse
30 Reachable (m13, m23) orelse Reachable (m14, m23);
31 val ok4 = Reachable (m11, m24) orelse Reachable (m12, m24) orelse
32 Reachable (m13, m24) orelse Reachable (m14, m24);
33 val precedence = ok1 andalso ok2 andalso ok3 andalso ok4;
34 val enfCondFulfilled = m1Correct andalso m2Correct andalso precedence;
35
36
37 State-space query when ’condActually=false’:
38
39 val m1Nodes = SearchNodes(
40 EntireGraph,
41 fn n => length (Mark.REVOCATION’REF1_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 n) > 0 andalso
42 length (Mark.REVOCATION’REF2_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 n) > 0,
43 NoLimit, fn n => n, [], op :: );
44 val m1Len = length m1Nodes;
45 val m11 = List.nth (m1Nodes, 0); val m12 = List.nth (m1Nodes, 1);
46 val m1Correct = if length m1Nodes>0 andalso
47 not (List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’REF1_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 m11 , 0) ) andalso
48 not (List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’REF2_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 m12 , 0) )
49 then true else false;
50 val m2Nodes = SearchNodes(
51 EntireGraph,
52 fn n => length (Mark.REVOCATION’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 n) > 0,
53 NoLimit, fn n => n, [], op :: );
54 val m2Len = length m2Nodes;
55 val m2Correct = m2Len =0 ;
56 val enfCondFulfilled = m1Correct andalso m2Correct;
Table 20: State-space analysis for enforceable conditions property
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Result - condActually=true Result  - condActually=false
Fig. 11: Result of Query as shown in Table 20
We now are in the position to write queries to check the above statements.
These queries are shown in Table 21.
From Table 21, we can see that the query is divided into two parts: one
to show when only SP ATTACK3 and REF ATTACK2 that are included (line
1-32), and another one when we include only SP ATTACK4, REF ATTACK1,
and REF ATTACK2 (collusion between SP1 and malicious referees - line 35-
67). The reason for splitting the queries into two parts is because some of the
attacks (notably SP ATTACK3 and SP ATTACK4) are not logically possible to
be launched simultaneously.
Finally, we can execute the query to verify if the security property still holds.
The result of our query is shown in Figure 12. The result shows that the enforce-
able condition property still holds even in the presence of the mentioned attacks.
Property 4 (Conditions Abuse Resistant). An SP and an IdP must not be
able to fool the user to encrypt the PII, or the VE private key, under a set of
conditions different from those originally agreed. Similarly, an SP or IdP must
not be able to successfully revoke the user’s PII using conditions different from
those originally agreed.
When all parties behave honestly, the verification of this property is straight-
forward:
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1 WHEN SP_ATTACK3 and REF_ATTACK2 are included:
2 val m1Nodes = SearchNodes(
3 EntireGraph,
4 fn n => length (Mark.REVOCATION’REF1_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 n) > 0 andalso
5 length (Mark.REVOCATION’REF2_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 n) > 0,
6 NoLimit, fn n => n, [], op :: );
7 val m1Len = length m1Nodes; val m11 = List.nth (m1Nodes, 0);
8 val m12 = List.nth (m1Nodes, 1); val m13 = List.nth (m1Nodes, 2);
9 val m14 = List.nth (m1Nodes, 3); val m15 = List.nth (m1Nodes, 4);
10 val m16 = List.nth (m1Nodes, 5);
11 val m1Correct = if length m1Nodes>0 andalso
12 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’REF1_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 m11 , 0) andalso
13 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’REF1_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 m12 , 0) andalso
14 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’REF1_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 m13 , 0) andalso
15 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’REF1_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 m14 , 0) andalso
16 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’REF1_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 m15 , 0) andalso
17 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’REF1_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 m16 , 0) andalso
18 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’REF2_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 m11 , 0) andalso
19 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’REF2_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 m12 , 0) andalso
20 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’REF2_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 m13 , 0) andalso
21 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’REF2_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 m14 , 0) andalso
22 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’REF2_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 m15 , 0) andalso
23 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’REF2_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 m16 , 0)
24 then true else false;
25 val m2Nodes = SearchNodes(
26 EntireGraph, fn n => length (Mark.REVOCATION’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 n) > 0,
27 NoLimit, fn n => n, [], op :: );
28 val m2Len = length m2Nodes;
29 val m2Correct = if m2Len=0 then true else false;
30 val failedDecrypt = UpperInteger (Mark.REVOCATION’UCHVE_PIECE_DECRYPT_SUCCESS 1) = 0;
31 val refNoRecover = UpperInteger (Mark.REVOCATION’REF_RECOVERED_VE_PRIVATE_KEY 1) = 0;
32 val enfCondFulfilled = m1Correct andalso m2Correct andalso refNoRecover andalso failedDecrypt;
33
34
35 WHEN SP_ATTACK4, REF_ATTACK1, and REF_ATTACK2 are included:
36 val os = TextIO.openOut("enforceable_attack.txt");
37 TextIO.output (os, "Check M1 marking:\n");
38 val m1Nodes = SearchNodes(
39 EntireGraph, fn n => length (Mark.REVOCATION’REF1_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 n) > 0 andalso
40 length (Mark.REVOCATION’REF2_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 n) > 0,
41 NoLimit, fn n => n, [], op :: );
42 val m1Len = length m1Nodes; val m11 = List.nth (m1Nodes, 0);
43 val m12 = List.nth (m1Nodes, 1); val m13 = List.nth (m1Nodes, 2);
44 val m14 = List.nth (m1Nodes, 3); val m15 = List.nth (m1Nodes, 4);
45 val m16 = List.nth (m1Nodes, 3);
46 val m1Correct = if length m1Nodes>0 andalso
47 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’REF1_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 m11 , 0) andalso
48 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’REF1_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 m12 , 0) andalso
49 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’REF1_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 m13 , 0) andalso
50 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’REF1_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 m14 , 0) andalso
51 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’REF1_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 m15 , 0) andalso
52 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’REF1_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 m16 , 0) andalso
53 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’REF2_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 m11 , 0) andalso
54 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’REF2_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 m12 , 0) andalso
55 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’REF2_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 m13 , 0) andalso
56 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’REF2_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 m14 , 0) andalso
57 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’REF2_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 m15 , 0) andalso
58 List.nth (Mark.REVOCATION’REF2_COND_FULFILLMENT 1 m16 , 0)
59 then true else false;
60 val m2Nodes = SearchNodes(
61 EntireGraph, fn n => length (Mark.REVOCATION’RECOVERED_USER_PII 1 n) > 0,
62 NoLimit, fn n => n, [], op :: );
63 val m2Len = length m2Nodes;
64 val m2Correct = if m2Len=0 then true else false;
65 val failedDecrypt = UpperInteger (Mark.REVOCATION’UCHVE_PIECE_DECRYPT_SUCCESS 1) =1 ;
66 val refNoRecover = UpperInteger (Mark.REVOCATION’REF_RECOVERED_VE_PRIVATE_KEY 1) = 0;
67 val enfCondFulfilled = m1Correct andalso m2Correct andalso refNoRecover andalso failedDecrypt;
Table 21: State-space analysis for enforceable conditions property with attack be-
haviours included
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Fig. 12: Result of Query as shown in Table 21
– in a session, the label used to encrypt the user PII must be the same between
what the user has, and the SP1 and SP2 have,
– in a session, the label used to encrypt the VE one-time private key must be
the same between what the user has and SP1,
– in a session, the label used to re-encrypt the VE one-time private key must
be the same between what the user has and SP2.
The queries used to verify this property is shown in Table 22.
Nevertheless, there are several types of attacks that could be launched in an
attempt to compromise this property. We capture such attacks in USER ATTACK1,
USER ATTACK4, SP ATTACK1, SP ATTACK11, and SP ATTACK2. There-
fore, to verify this property in the presence of such attacks, we need to show
that a secure protocol must behave as follows:
– when USER ATTACK1 or SP ATTACK1 is included, the PKVE operation
should fail and the protocol should terminate,
– when USER ATTACK4 is included, the TPM Proof verification by the IDP
should fail and protocol terminates,
– when SP ATTACK2 is included, the user must be able to detect it and as
a result, prevent the ARM from doing the re-encryption of the VE private
key.
The queries used to verify this property in the presence of the detailed attacks
are shown in Table 23.
Property 5 (Escrow Session Unlinkability). SPs and IdPs must not be able
to link a user from one escrow session to another from the session data gathered.
In the absence of attack model, this property can be verified by showing that
that multiple session executions of the escrow session do not leave any session
data which can be used to link these sessions to the same user. In other words,
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1 val os = TextIO.openOut("condAbuse.txt")
2 val userRec1 = readUserRecord("user_sess1.txt")
3 val userRec2 = readUserRecord("user_sess2.txt")
4 val idpRec1= readIDPRecord("idp_sess1.txt")
5 val idpRec2= readIDPRecord("idp_sess2.txt")
6 val sp1Rec1 = readSPRecord("sp1_sess1.txt")
7 val sp1Rec2 = readSPRecord("sp1_sess2.txt")
8 val sp2Rec1 = readSPRecord("sp2_sess1.txt")
9 val sp2Rec2 = readSPRecord("sp2_sess2.txt")
10
11 val cond1_1 = #conditions1(#conditions(userRec1))
12 val cond2_1 = #conditions2(#conditions(userRec1))
13 val cond1_2 = #conditions1(#conditions(userRec2))
14 val cond2_2 = #conditions2(#conditions(userRec2))
15
16 val idpSP1CondOK = #conditions1(#idpConditions(idpRec1)) = cond1_1 andalso
17 #conditions1(#idpConditions(idpRec2)) = cond1_2 andalso
18 #conditions(sp1Rec1) = cond1_1 andalso
19 #conditions(sp1Rec2) = cond1_2
20
21 val idpSP2CondOK =
22 cond2_1= #conditions(sp2Rec1) andalso cond2_2 = #conditions(sp2Rec2) andalso
23 #conditions2(#idpConditions(idpRec1)) = cond2_1 andalso
24 #conditions2(#idpConditions(idpRec2)) = cond2_2
Table 22: State-space and session data analysis for the Conditions-Abuse property -no
attack scenarios
each escrow session data (including VE public key, VE ciphertext, UCHVE ci-
phertext, conditions, and so on) must be unique to that session only. A simple
session-data analysis (as shown in Table 24 confirms that this property is satis-
fied.
At this point, we do not find any plausible attack scenarios that could vi-
olate this property. Due to the non-deterministic nature of the cryptographic
primitives used, and due to the zero-knowledge property, the IdPs and SPs will
not know the identity of the user, and thus, do not have the knowledge to tell
if they are interacting with the same user across multiple escrow sessions. This
property may be violated if a user applies the same session data (such as same
VE keys, same conditions string) across multiple escrow sessions. Nevertheless,
such actions contradict users’ interest (which is to preserve their privacy) and
are therefore not considered as a valid ‘attack’.
7 Conclusion
We have shown that CPNs can be used to model and verify complex PESPs in
a scalable and extensible manner. These are two important factors in designing
a secure PESPs, given that the security behaviour and the attack scenarios in-
volved are application-specific, instead of well-defined as normally encountered
in designing cryptographic primitives. We have also demonstrated how security
properties of a PESP can be reasonsed using state spaces and session data gen-
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1 USER_ATTACK1 or SP_ATTACK1
2 val os = TextIO.openOut("condAbuse_1.txt");
3 TextIO.output (os, "Check behaviour when incorrect conditions used at PE stage:\n");
4 val PKVESuccessBE = PredAllArcs(
5 fn a => case ArcToBE a of
6 Bind.PE’IDP_GENERATES_STORES_PSEUDONYM_AND_SEND_TO_USER (1, {...} ) => true
7 | _ => false);
8 val correct1 = length PKVESuccessBE = 0;
9 if correct1 then TextIO.output (os, "Protocol behaves correctly when incorrect
10 conditions used at PE stage.\n\n") else
11 TextIO.output(os, "Protocol behaves unexpectedly when incorrect
12 conditions used at PE stage. \n\n");
13 TextIO.closeOut os;
14
15 USER_ATTACK4 or SP_ATTACK11
16 val os = TextIO.openOut("condAbuse_2.txt");
17 TextIO.output (os, "Check behaviour when incorrect conditions used during KE stage:\n");
18 val TPMProofSuccessBE = PredAllArcs(
19 fn a => case ArcToBE a of
20 Bind.KE’IDP_VERIFIES_MODULE_2_TPM_PROOF (1, {result=x,...} ) => x=true
21 | _ => false);
22 val expectedTPMBE1 = length TPMProofSuccessBE = 0;
23 if expectedTPMBE1 then TextIO.output (os, "Protocol behaves correctly when
24 incorrect conditions used at KE stage.\n\n") else
25 TextIO.output(os, "Protocol behaves unexpectedly when incorrect conditions
26 used at KE stage.\n\n");
27 TextIO.closeOut os;
28
29 SP_ATTACK2
30 val os = TextIO.openOut("condAbuse_3.txt");
31 TextIO.output (os, "Check behaviour when incorrect conditions used during MC stage:\n");
32 val TPMProofSuccessBE2 = PredAllArcs(
33 fn a => case ArcToBE a of
34 Bind.MC’IDP_VERIFIES_MODULE_2_TPM_PROOF (1, {result=x,...} ) => x=true
35 | _ => false);
36 val expectedTPMBE2 = length TPMProofSuccessBE = 0;
37 if expectedTPMBE2 then TextIO.output (os, "Protocol behaves correctly when
38 incorrect conditions used at MC stage.\n\n") else
39 TextIO.output(os, "Protocol behaves unexpectedly when incorrect conditions
40 used at MC stage.\n\n");
41 TextIO.closeOut os;
Table 23: State-space and session data analysis for the Conditions-Abuse property with
attacks
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1 val os = TextIO.openOut("linkable.txt");
2
3 val userRec1 = readUserRecord("user_sess1.txt");
4 val userRec2 = readUserRecord("user_sess2.txt");
5 val sp2Rec1 = readSPRecord("sp2_sess1.txt");
6 val sp2Rec2 = readSPRecord("sp2_sess2.txt");
7 val sp1Rec1 = readSPRecord("sp1_sess1.txt");
8 val sp1Rec2 = readSPRecord("sp1_sess2.txt");
9 val idpRec1 = readIDPRecord("idp_sess1.txt");
10 val idpRec2 = readIDPRecord("idp_sess2.txt");
11
12 val sameCond1 = #conditions1(#conditions(userRec1)) = #conditions1(#idpConditions(idpRec1)) andalso
13 #conditions1(#conditions(userRec1))= #conditions(sp1Rec1) andalso
14 #conditions1(#conditions(userRec2)) = #conditions1(#idpConditions(idpRec2)) andalso
15 #conditions1(#conditions(userRec2)) = #conditions(sp1Rec2);
16
17 val sameCond2 = #conditions2(#conditions(userRec1)) = #conditions2(#idpConditions(idpRec1)) andalso
18 #conditions2(#conditions(userRec1))= #conditions(sp2Rec1) andalso
19 #conditions2(#conditions(userRec2)) = #conditions2(#idpConditions(idpRec2)) andalso
20 #conditions2(#conditions(userRec2)) = #conditions(sp2Rec2);
21
22 val diffCond = #conditions1(#conditions(userRec1)) <> #conditions2(#conditions(userRec1));
23 val condConsistent = sameCond1 andalso sameCond2 andalso diffCond;
24
25 val oneTimeVEKeys = #veKeys(userRec1) <> #veKeys(userRec2);
26 val oneTimeVEPub = #vePubKey(idpRec1) <> #vePubKey(idpRec2);
27
28 val oneTimeVeCipher = #cipherVE(sp1Rec1) <> #cipherVE(sp1Rec2) andalso
29 #cipherVE(sp2Rec1) <> #cipherVE(sp2Rec2)
30
31 val oneTimeUchve = #cipherUCHVE(sp1Rec1) <> #cipherUCHVE(sp1Rec2) andalso
32 #cipherUCHVE(sp2Rec1) <> #cipherUCHVE(sp2Rec2) andalso
33 #cipherUCHVE(sp1Rec1) <> #cipherUCHVE(sp2Rec1) andalso
34 #cipherUCHVE(sp1Rec2) <> #cipherUCHVE(sp2Rec2)
35
36 val oneTimePseudo = #pseudo(userRec1) <> #pseudo(userRec2)
37
38 val property5 = condConsistent andalso oneTimeVEKeys andalso oneTimeVEPub andalso
39 oneTimeVeCipher andalso oneTimeUchve andalso oneTimePseudo;
40
41 if property5 then TextIO.output(os, "Linkable property is SATISFIED") else
42 TextIO.output(os, "Linkable property is NOT SATISFIED");
43
44 TextIO.closeOut os;
Table 24: State-space and session data analysis for the Escrow Session Unlinkability
property - no attack
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erated from execution of the CPN models. This investigation has also led us to
a CPN-based modeling and verification approach to PESPs in general.
Future work involve using the model to do a performance analysis of the
protocol to assess its efficiency during deployment. We also need to refine and
generalize the modeling techniques proposed in this paper (the cryptographic
primitive abstraction, attack parameterization, session data capture) such that
they can be applied to other PESPs. Finally, we envisage the development of a
user front-end to simplify and automate as much as possible the tasks required in
the modeling and verification of PESPs. The function of such a front-end could
be as simple as aiding users with the configuration of the model parameters, to a
full-blown automation whereby a user who does not have any knowledge of CPN
can generate the required back-end CPN model with only a PESP specification.
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